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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE AND JAPANESE INFRASTRUCTURE REGIME:  




Ever since the so-called rise of China has started and particularly after Japan has lost a 
key Indonesian high-speed railway to China, Sino-Japanese relations have been 
increasingly posited on a geo-economic rivalry between both states. As a result, 
perspective on Chinese and Japanese infrastructure investment tends to place the state at 
the center of explanations and be guided more by what infrastructure projects are 
imagined to leverage, than what Southeast Asian countries have influenced. Taking 
issues from existing studies which have overly coalesced the discussion around 
geopolitical standpoint and norm-based approach, this study brings fresh framings of 
the political economy of Chinese and Japanese infrastructure regime in Southeast Asia. 
By using the case study of Indonesia, this study compares the pattern of agenda setting 
and political settlement that China and Japan have pursued to accommodate state 
transformation pertaining to the infrastructure development in Indonesia. It also unfolds 
the ‘localized’ process of infrastructure regime that has implicated different levels of 
playing field which Japan and China have encountered in the country. The study puts 
forward the challenges and prospects for policy engagement by analyzing initiatives, 
such as Japan’s ODA-based projects, Indonesian government’s master plan MP3EI, 
China’s Belt and Road Initaitive (BRI), Japan’s Partnership Quality Initiative (PQI), and 
Indonesia’s proposed PPP (Public Private Partnership) scheme. Offering a unique 
perspective on the linkage of power configuration and infrastructure regime, this study 
finds that Chinese infrastructure regime reflects a continuous trial and error in linking 
capital accumulation with infrastructure agenda due to an uneven expansion of 
sub-national entities and companies to the infrastructure market. This has led to 
“de-institutionalization” of policy formulation and implementation in order to 
accommodate fragmented interests in Indonesia. Whereas, Japanese infrastructure 
regime demonstrates how infrastructure projects have been historically narrated and 
intertwined with the rationalization of economy as well as adjusted with the political 
constellation and economic structure in Indonesia. Such adjustment resulted political 
settlement that invariably upgraded informalization into “institutionalization” so as to 






1.1 Filling the gap  
Arvind Subramanian, in Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic 
Dominance (2011), once predicted that China is going to be a ‘peculiar kind of 
superpower’, one whose attraction is more materialistic than heartfelt, “It won’t have 
the soft power the United State has – people wanting to come, people wanting to live, 
people wanting to emulate it…That soft power is lacking, but that will not impede 
China” (p.211). Indeed, over the past decade, Southeast Asian countries, that are 
“geographically close but psychologically distant” have been nevertheless increasingly 
swayed by China’s peculiar soft power (Lam, 2015, p.100) Albeit suspiciously 
welcomed, China’s infrastructure modalities, either in the form of concessional loan or 
investment, has made tremendous inroads in financing large-scale infrastructure 
projects. More tellingly, while still a confusing concept to some in OECD countries, 
Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has seamlessly pave way for China-led 
infrastructure package. 
Especially significant is, the great wall of money has not only fueled an 
unprecedented need for the infrastructure development, but has also subsequently 
reshaped the geopolitical realities in which Japan has been greatly challenged (Copper, 
2016; Dreyer, 2006; Shimomura & Ohashi, 2013). In 2015, a shocking event of when 
Japan lost out to China on a five billion dollar deal of the Jakarta-Bandung High Speed 
Railway (HSR) has further underscored China’s rapidly growing importance as a 
global player in infrastructure development and financial diplomacy. Soon, Tokyo 
announced the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI), readily dispensing U$ 110 
billion funding package as counter-actions to retain its influence in 
infrastructure-financing in the region (Japanese METI, 2016, May 23) Diffusing 
specific ideals for the importance of ‘quality over quantity’, Japan is seemingly 
confident of its posturing so as to strike a point of difference with China’s risky 
infrastructure projects. 
Both scholars and pundits since then have been intrigued by this kind of regional 
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dynamic and have devoted a good deal of attention of it. Much ink has been spilled on 
two prongs. First, on the definitional side, this camp attempts to underpin the 
difference between China, an emerging partner (non-DAC member) and Japan as a 
long-standing development partner (DAC member) in the aspect of infrastructure 
financing, specifically pertaining to rules, norms, and governance. In light of 
OECD-defined ‘best practice’, China has been criticized on many fronts while in 
contrast, Japan’s approach has been largely legitimated. Some critics argue that 
China’s different principles and development philosophy than DAC’s, has hindered 
existing rules, undermined governance standard, and had negative local economic and 
political consequences, such as ‘debt trap’, environmental degradation, imported 
Chinese labor, and natural resources exploitation in an ‘unequal infrastructure for 
resources’ scheme (Green, 2019; Hodge, 2018). Furthermore, its weakly regulated 
overseas investment and emphasis on non-intervention often resulted simply 
irresponsible buck-passing in poorly-governed developing countries. While remain 
intact in pioneering DAC norms-based arguments, some scholars throw lights on the 
issue in a different way. Kratz & Pavlićević (2018) argue that both Japan and China 
have altered their approaches to overseas infrastructure development projects due to 
the stronger bargaining power of host country. This is also related with what Yoon 
(2018) argues about ‘host country’s outside options’. Outside option is defined as a 
best alternative for a party during negotiations, should that party withdraw unilaterally 
from those negotiations. In this sense, insofar as players can use outside options to 
gain leverage by threatening to walk away (Binmore, Avner, & Sutton, 1989), both 
China and Japan are prompted to improve their aid or investment approach so as to be 
the most credible option. For example, in what Kratz & Pavlićević (2018) coin as 
‘Japan leveling down’, the Japanese government loosen its strict policies by exempting 
a government guarantee in providing yen loans to sub-sovereign entities of developing 
countries with several conditions after the failure in the Indonesian project in 2015. On 
the other side, the ‘leveling up’ China began to reassess its performance by putting 
more emphasis on safety, environmental protection, and local benefits.  
Second camp dominated by international relations scholars is largely guided by 
geostrategic approach. The BRI is viewed, in the account of realism, as a mix of 
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geopolitics and geo-economics objectives in which China marshals its economic 
power for strategic objective and weave neighboring countries’ security and economic 
needs into a Sino-centric network (Beeson, 2018; Vien, Yan, & Blackburn, 2015). As 
Harris & Blackwill (2016) put it, “The use of economic instruments to promote and 
defend national interests and to produce beneficial geopolitical results and the effects 
of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals.” Norris’ proposed 
economic statecraft concept (2016) offers the representative assessment. BRI regarded 
as economic statecraft provides more room for Beijing to deliberately manipulate 
international economic activities to capitalize on, reinforce, or reduce the associated 
strategic externalities. Two factors in particular speak to the geopolitical logic of the 
BRI. First, BRI routes conspicuously bypass the maritime checkpoints along with 
China-led projects like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Kunming-Singapore 
Railway, and East-West Corridor that being a case in point. Given China’s enormous 
financial power and infrastructure construction capabilities meet the growing needs of 
regional countries for infrastructure development, China may increasingly bolster its 
political clout (David Arase, 2015; Johnson, 2016; Suehiro, 2017). Second, while 
Western and Japanese investors are largely private, China’s largest companies are 
SOEs that often involved in controversial and highly risky projects. This background 
often leads to the assumption that China’s economic logic is subordinate to its 
strategic interest, as Ren, Liang, and Zheng (2010) depict, “How their state cultivates 
an ideology of ‘national pride’ in SOEs, making them usually unintentionally indulge 
national missions in conducting overseas strategies.”  
Likewise, Japan’s PQI is characterized by Tokyo’s strategic orientation to win 
over Southeast Asian countries in exchange for enhancing their security and strategic 
cooperation with Japan. The ambition was seen in Japan’s new aid strategy announced 
in 2018 in which Prime Minister Abe incorporated Japan’s ‘high-quality’ infrastructure 
aid into the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ which was announced in 2016. 
Infrastructure aid is used as a tool to cultivate partnership with recipients, who share 
with Japan “a grievance” towards the ‘China’s threat’, particularly over lingering 
maritime and territorial issues (Jain, 2016; Jain & Horimoto, 2016). Additionally, this 
camp posits that the use of aid is to eclipse Beijing over its long-term infrastructure 
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plan and strategic influence. Acknowledging Cambodia’s contentious position in 
maintaining ASEAN unity on the South China Sea issue, Abe Shinzo has repeatedly 
tried to change Cambodia’s position through infrastructure support commitment 
(Yoshimatsu, 2017). When Then Sein government decided to reduce Myanmar’s 
overdependence on China, Abe government quickly provided the country with yen 
loans for various infrastructure projects, including roads, power plants, ports, and 
special economic zone (Kraisoraphong, 2017).   
This camp also attempts to find the linkage between geopolitical interests and 
economic interests. In the case of Japan, many view that the connectivity idea and the 
high-quality infrastructure are aimed to maintain its dominant regional position in 
infrastructure development and are largely driven by imperative to return to the old 
path of exporting industrial products and physical infrastructure as part of its effort to 
revive the stagnant economy (Yang, 2017; Yoshimatsu, 2018). In a similar vein, the 
nature of mercantilist has also been apparent in China’s infrastructure modalities. BRI 
and concessional loans are often portrayed as Beijing’s predatory attempt to kill two 
birds with one stone – addressing overcapacity at home and advancing its diplomatic 
clout (Huong, 2018; Johnston & Rudyak, 2017). Like the mercantilism of yore, 
Chinese infrastructure loan is aimed at and results in the accumulation of foreign 
exchanges reserves, which at once, converting its industrial overcapacity into a huge 
trade surplus (Wang, 2017) . It is possible because of the omnipresence of “Chinese 
bundled of aid, trade, and investment” (Weissenbach, 2011, p.253) in which host 
countries are required to spend loans by buying infrastructure material from Chinese 
market and subsequently open up a new channel for transferring resources of both aid 
and trade. In short, infrastructure associated with both PQI and BRI, has both 
‘business ends’ on one side and ‘power play end’ on the other side. It is appropriated to 
achieve either or both of these aims.  
These studies have certainly enriched our knowledge of Chinese and Japanese 
backed infrastructure development in the region. However, and without wishing to 
downplay the contribution of these works – should we be surprised by these 
conclusions? Problematic is, the dominant literature fails to grasp the overall picture of 
political spectrum of infrastructure modalities led by China and Japan, as the apparent 
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interpretation, ruefully, is that Southeast Asian voices are muted. In fact, Southeast 
Asian’ path to infrastructure development is not necessarily a blank canvas on which 
Japan or China can easily and unilaterally push forward their money so as to gain 
influence and dictate the regional agenda. Infrastructure development in Southeast 
Asia has been invariably entangled in a politically-difficult situation. Infrastructure, be 
it loan project or investment project, is central to a multi-dimensional process whereby 
multiple forms of power interact and reshape the policy, if not unintended outcomes. It 
thus gives leeway for such process of contestation, negotiation, and compromises 
within ‘multiple rule of game’ in multiple site of institution and actors (see Jayasuriya, 
2015; Tubilewicz & Jayasuriya, 2015). For instance in Myanmar, why Japan’s 
apparently stricter-aid conditions have superseded China’s less prescriptive approach 
and why have been many large-scale projects such as Mytsone Dam postponed? (see 
Kirchherr, J. Charles, & Walton, 2017; Lamb & Dao, 2017; Sein, Li, & Zhu, 2016; 
Summers & Summers, 2016). Similarly, in Vietnam, in the face of escalating tensions 
over defense issue, Vietnamese government nevertheless inked agreement with 
Chinese contractors that accounted for up to 90 per cent of EPC (Engineering, 
Procurement, and Construction) contracts for energy infrastructure as of 2012 (see Le, 
2017). Indonesia also provides a good case in point to illustrate the overwhelming 
contradictive outcomes. Although Japan had committed to feasibility studies for the 
project from 2009, the Indonesian government tuned down a Japanese bid in favor of 
China - regardless last-minute efforts by Abe and his delegation to provide a better 
offer than China (see Harding, Chilkoti, & Mitchell, 2015; Yoshimatsu, 2017, 2018). 
Clearly, the surprising event reminds us of other unexplored aspect of infrastructure 
development. The main point is that, what concerned Japan the most is not Beijing’s 
rising influence across the country per se. Rather, it is how Chinese entry to the 
‘infrastructure market’ has been coalesced into an increasing variety of new political 
actors and policy entrepreneurs in the recipient state. For example, the state 
transformation in Indonesia rendered infrastructure policy and decision making a 
complex process played out among multiple actors of different kinds; something that 
Japan never encountered before the democratization and decentralization. Both of 
policy-making and the implementation are contingent upon structural features and 
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operational mechanism of political system where infrastructure modalities are played 
out. Certainly, the existing literatures fail to capture such crucial political nature of 
infrastructure modalities.  
 
 
1.2 Addressing Infrastructure Regime  
 
Against the background, this paper aims to challenge such intellectual 
boundaries and brought fresh framings of how have Chinese and Japanese playing 
field in the infrastructure domain been reshaped and played out. Such dynamics can be 
captured in the political economy of Chinese and Japanese infrastructure regime. As 
this study puts emphasis on the interstate and intrastate relations, in particular bringing 
host countries into the frame, the concept of infrastructure regime is presented in a 
multilevel perspective, that reflects political choices and institutional arrangements 
that structure multiple forms of power and the organization of a system of provision 
including resource distribution, social practices, and technologies. The key aspect of 
the infrastructure regime is the progressive alignment of the daily tasks of many 
actors; its relative stability on socio-political configurations and economic trends; and 
how it integrates incremental change around infrastructure development due to state 
transformation. China and Japan do not race from the same starting line nor run under 
similar political structures. Both stepped into such geographically uneven and 
contradictory set of historically process of regional development in a different phase of 
time. However, similar point they share is that their infrastructure regimes have 
invariably been accompanied by a complex dialectical process that is shaped by 
interactions among different levels of groups and interests at the regional and national 
level (see Hameiri & Jones, 2018; Jayasuriya, 2015). Infrastructures rendered by 
China and Japan as hallmark of bilateral cooperation, have a dual character. On the 
one hand, they are truly a vital part of every projects contributing for economic growth 
and development. On the other hand, they are localized and continuously fixed as an 
“expression of the politics of everyday experience” and infused with a complex set of 
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political relationship (see Elias & Rethel, 2016).  
Thus, research questions raised in the study are: (1) What are the pattern of 
agenda setting and political settlement that Chinese and Japanese pursued to 
accommodate such complex power relations pertaining to infrastructure development in 
Southeast Asia? (2) How have different levels of playing field affected Japan and 
China’s approach in the face of infrastructure development ‘localization’? Arguments 
developed in this study are not constrained by the imposition of a rigid framework, as 
the purpose of this article is to open a fresh research agenda and seeks to achieve two 
objectives. First, it is to provide a contextual overview of the way in which China’s and 
Japan’s encounter with either internal political process or host countries’ political 
transformation affected the infrastructure modalities and policy. Second, it does not 
entirely deny the existence of strategic interests and geopolitical competition, but to 
offer a more realistic picture, of constraints on the policy options of national states, to 
domestic institutions, state capacities and objectives, and to ultimately come to a clearer 
understanding of the conditions under which Chinese and Japanese infrastructure 
regime can be played out by various scale of interests and power.  
The author acknowledges that national differences and diversity in Southeast 
Asia. But given the size, strategic importance, and diversity within Indonesia itself, 
regional perspectives are more likely to be mirrored. The present study offers numerous 
within- and cross-case opportunities both to assess our expectations in the context of 
mixed or uneven performances and to avoid the small N-problem common in studies of 
single cases. Only focusing on specific country, can we really delve into the real 
dynamics of political and economic forces involved in the ‘localization’. In so doing, it 
draws on official data, secondary literature in recent years, interviews across Japan, 
China, and Indonesia. One caveat: data from Chinese ministry (i.e. Ministry of 
Commerce ‘MOFCOM’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘MOFA’) and Japanese officials 
(i.e. Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, ‘METI’; Japan International 
Cooperation Agencies, ‘JICA’; Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, ‘OECF’, the 
Japan Bank of International Cooperation, ‘JBIC’ ) are not cited in equal proportions. 
This is not an intentional manipulation by the author, but simply a reflection of the fact 
that Japan has more frequently published Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 
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investment-related documents.  
   
2. Alignment of Interests: Informalization and Institutionalization  
Despite four years have passed since Japan lost to China over the controversial 
Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway project, discussions regarding Sino-Japanese 
relations in the region remain centered on the distinct notion of power and rivalry. Many 
studies have been published in recent years tend to focus on how Japan counteracts 
Beijing’s hallmark project by promoting ‘quality’ infrastructure projects (i.e Dadabaev, 
2018; Mattlin & Gaens, 2018; Zhao, 2019). However, very few studies, if any, have 
attempted to compare Chinese and Japanese ‘daily interactions’ and encounters with 
host countries’ various groups and interests. Often, studies that intended to compare 
China’s and Japan’s engagement with Indonesia, particularly in the infrastructure 
development, have been overshadowed by the analysis of Indonesian independent 
foreign policy and its pragmatism in “cherry-picking” between China and Japan (i.e 
Fitriani, 2018; Pattiradjawane, 2016). Those few studies that intend to pay attention to 
power relations involving China and Japan in domestic levels fail to delve into 
Indonesian case further due to overwhelming perception that the basis of comparison is 
almost non-existent. Nevertheless, the fact that two countries tapped into Indonesia 
under different set of historically process and of political spectrum should not constrain 
scholars to make an empirically-grounded comparison of Indonesian interactions with 
the most important countries in the region: China and Japan.  
 As mentioned in the introduction section, China and Japan stepped into 
Indonesia under a different set of historically process of regional development and of 
political constellation. This has dynamized Chinese and Japanese infrastructure regime 
in Indonesia to reach an outcome that reflects contradictory process, if not unconscious, 
of conflicts, negotiations, and compromises between diverse groups. Infrastructure 
regime entails a playing field, rife with adaptation, learning process, and negotiation. 
Large-scale infrastructure projects and policy associated with the regime cannot be 
readily understood in a purely physical or material fashion. Instead, they imply an 
output of political contestation, coalitions, and new alliances in the trajectory of 
economic development. The state has been basically divided across bureaucratic, capital 
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forces, different levels of government, where infrastructure can be on the one hand 
lucrative industry for them to expand capital, uphold incentive, or maintain rent-seeking 
(Hutchison et.al , 2014). It can liberate the private interests from a range of collective 
social demands or even giving leeway for expanding capital should they are useful in 
securing particular national economic or political objectives (Robison, 2009, p.16). Nor 
is it any exaggeration to say that vast and growing army of consultants have also been 
the beneficiaries of trends to outsource policy and technical fixes to complex regional 
infrastructure roadmap. Neither it is wrong to say that infrastructure has been such an 
open-ended terms in which real implementation reveals new mechanism of resource 
distribution, including nationalistic policy, and to some extent create new production 
activity as well as deepening capital network (Hout & Robison, 2009). Clearly, 
Indonesia epitomizes such dynamics. The level of Indonesia’s connection with and 
penetration by China and Japan pose nuances and features of projects these states plan 
and negotiate that would be elaborated and compared in the following section.  
 
2.1 Japan: From ʻinformalizationʼ to ʻre-institutionalizationʼ 
 
 Japan has played a leading role in Indonesian infrastructure development that 
can be traced to its ODA contribution on 20 percent of the toll road construction around 
greater Jakarta, port development, the development of five airports, including Bali, 
Surabaya, Jakarta, Palembang, and Kertajati International Airport, as well as Jakarta’s 
long-awaited first subway (MRT). It has also secured full-scale technology transfer 
mechanism, knowledge on the water resource management through mega-power plants, 
three large-scale multipurpose dams (known as Karangkates, Kali Konto, and Riam 
Kanan), and Brantas River Basin Development Project (JICA, 2018a). However, 
stressing such long-term structural dimension and Japanese embeddedness in 
Indonesia’s developmental trajectory, Japanese infrastructure regime has never been 
one-dimensional result of clearly bounded, intended, top-down practices. State 
transformation in Indonesia has invariably influenced power constellations by 
consciously or unconsciously providing power resources to certain group in society, 
while closing economic and political opportunities for others.   
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During the New Order era, the idea of infrastructure was subsumed under a 
vision of development that became known as the ‘Development Trilogy’, consisting of 
Stability, Growth, and Equity. In a nutshell, Japanese economic cooperation 
(keizaikyoryoku) with Indonesia was promoted in line with the national policy 
emphasized by Indonesian government. Infrastructure projects were identified and 
policy was formulated in accordance with Indonesia’s five-year development plan 
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun / Repelita) (JICA, 2010a; Shiraishi, 1997). For 
major recipients of yen loans, including Indonesia, OECF and JICA had always carried 
out studies of macroeconomic conditions and of various sectors of Indonesia based on 
the Repelita. The information was used to analyze development issues and identify the 
priority of projects through policy dialogue.  
 Although it looked simple, the Repelita contained powerful idea, which more 
than anything else, implied the New Order’s pragmatic and ideological standard against 
which all economic policies could be measured. Indonesian state institutions tended to 
adopt a Repelita-based infrastructure development, but actually keep functioning 
according to different forms of social logics. Key elites, social forces, institution, and 
conditions mixed in different ways that accounted for the great disparity in state 
practices. The intermingling of Japan’s politics and such power constellations has led to 
the process of engagement of different sets of actors while Soeharto remained the sole 
locus of political power. Both informalization and institutionalization of competing 
interests coexisted and accordingly added nuances to the Japan-led infrastructure 
regime.   
The infrastructure regime stemmed not from a mere adjustment to the Repelita, 
but also from the political settlement reached among important camps in Indonesia. 
First, technocrats group. This group was in charge of development, thrived in the state 
of political demobilization, whose expertise had a significant impact on broad economic 
policies, above all monetary policies and major allocation of resources. During the early 
phase of Repelita, technocrats like Ali Wardhana, Radius Prawiro, Widjojo Nitisastro, 
Emil Salim, and other ministerial technocrats able to proceed with their reforms – such 
as trade, privatization, investment, and importantly to pledge support for the National 
Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). The principal power that Bappenas had, 
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unlike planning units in other countries, was the budgetary allocation power, while the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) was responsible for the allocation of routine expenditure 
(Amir, 2012; Prawiro, 1998). This kind of configuration thus had a great impact on its 
effectiveness in national planning and development project coordination as well as 
implementation. With this authority in hand, Bappenas had been able to exercise a 
stronger power in coordinating the ministries (considering the chairman of Bappenas 
also doubled as the Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs) and other institutions to 
formulate project proposals and activities in accordance with the national plan. One of 
institutionalized forms of such project proposal is “master plan” – that has been a key 
pillar of Japanese infrastructure regime in Indonesia. The master plan approach has been 
adopted in sectoral projects under the Indonesia-Japan cooperation. Many cooperation 
projects were identified not based on individual project planning, but on the master plan 
from the viewpoint of long-term perspective and inter-sectoral coordination (JICA, 
2010a).  Master plan was communicated at different levels, but most conventionally 
through the channels of line ministries, mainly Bappenas. In the initial stage, 
cooperation to Bappenas started when Dr. Saburo Okita was assigned as an advisor to 
Bappenas in preparing five-year development plans at the national level. A stress was 
laid on how to work out frameworks for development plan and further generated 
numerous master plans for specific projects (Ichimura, 2015). 
However, practices that circumvent technocratic, top-down reform have always 
played a significant role in implementation processes of large-scale, planned projects. 
Underlying informal practices counter-balance the shortcomings of the technocratically- 
abstract formal system. The more schematic and simplified the formal order, the more 
failure-prone it is and the more it is in need of informal ‘rescue measures’ in order to 
function at all, just as addressed by Scott (1998:51), non-conformist practices thus may 
evolved as indispensable functional conditions for the formal system. Indeed, early 
years of Bappenas reflected the ‘informalization’ of power relations. The Bappenas was 
originally founded by Soekarno in 1952 under the name of the National Development 
Council (Dewan Perancang National ‘Depernas’) The immediate task was to formulate 
Indonesia’s first five-year plan, namely the development plan for 1956-1960 (Pauker, 
1962). However, it did not function well due to lack of expertise in development 
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planning and project implementation. Under Soeharto, Bappenas had the task to design 
and implement the five-year development plans as well as to draft annual program. In 
many cases, puro-fai (project-finding) mission played a significant role in shaping 
Bappenas’ function. Japanese private sectors even drafted the project proposals on 
behalf of the local government agencies to apply for ODA. Efforts undertaken to initiate 
a project, pushing the project for selection, establishing connections with influential 
bureaucrats and politicians, and other investment in social functions were then 
connected to dango practices (taking turns winning the project). It became a race to get 
the credits and investment among various Japanese consultants, trading firms (sogo 
sosha) and contractors (Söderberg, 1996, 2001). Pacific Consultant International and 
Nippon Koei are examples of Japanese engineering consulting firms who have been 
receiving consultant contracts in Indonesia continuously to date. These Japanese 
consultant firms also maintain their joint venture offices in Indonesia (JICA, 2005).  
These informal measures somewhat provided necessary conditions for further 
institutionalization of power relations and enabling transfer of knowledge. Brantas 
River project exemplified methodological ability to capture the shift in power 
reflections and resources allocation.  During the early decade of development 
(1960-1970), the project provided an ‘outward’ monopoly to Japanese state and 
non-state actors, including, Nippon Koei, Japanese consultant company. However, this 
company was also supported by two main subnational Indonesian agencies: Indonesian 
Ministry of Public Works and Indonesia State Electricity Company (PLN). Over 40 
years, this project has developed an informal network dominated by private and state 
interests. The project originally generated resistance from local groups, due to unequal 
distribution of power and resource allocation. The resulting Brantas River Basin 
Development Executing Office (Brantas Office), is an example of a new mode of water 
resources governance, not only in the Brantas basin, but also in Indonesia, known as the 
“one river one plan one management” (see Fujimoto, 2013) The new mode of water 
governance promoted integrated development of infrastructure and management of 
water resources and simultaneously illustrated shifts in authority and attempts to 
institutionalize competing interests. Stipulated in the Indonesia’s second long term 
25-year development plan (1994-2019), authority and responsibility for water allocation 
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and irrigation management was to be transferred gradually to the district and provincial 
levels, while national government remain the key authority in water resource related 
functions, particularly in macro and program planning and budgeting with JICA (Bhat, 
Ramu, & Kemper, 2005). These kinds of ‘formal’ institutional fixes pursued through 
Japanese infrastructural aid are still limited in China-led projects where rule and 
practice are more ad hoc and somewhat generates conflicting agenda.  
Second key camp is military network and powerful elites. Indonesia’s political 
economy under technocrats might have helped the country to formulate development 
plan and get loan assistance, yet it is somewhat less grounded to treat all ODA projects 
as an apolitical expression of rational choices, technocratic options, and market process. 
In particular cases, they had relatively little influence on or control over the political and 
bureaucratic processes that enabled the implementation of contracts, licenses, and other 
micro-economic details. As coined by Moertopo, (1973:40), “technocrats have been 
used as a political means to legitimize the bypassing of representative and competitive 
politics in the name of preventing market distortions against the demands of vested 
interest.” Sometimes, political camouflage and the omnipresence of “technocrats in 
shadow” during the project formulation were unavoidable. Some projects realized were 
rooted from the informal negotiation that quite aloof from the technocrats’ presence. In 
turn, some powerful generals worth their salt had leverage over large-scale 
infrastructure projects. Of the many groups within the strongest elite in Indonesia, the 
“Soeharto group” appeared to be most powerful, whose members occupied all the key 
positions in the country and greatly involved in the patronage-ridden network. Roughly, 
they were divided into the “finance generals”, “the money spinner”, the “political 
generals” who worked closely each other (see Borsuk & Chng, 2014; Schwarz, 2000; 
Vatikiotis, 1993). The most powerful “finance generals” were Alamsjah Ratu 
Prawiranegara, Sudjono Humardani, Suryo Wiryohadiputro, and Sofjar. Ibnu Sutowo 
was often tagged as money spinner, because of his remarkable contributions to the 
government’s coffers (at least before the state oil company, Pertamina, reached the nadir 
under his management) (Robison, 1986). Meanwhile, the most powerful of the political 
generals were Ali Murtopo and Benny Moerdani. Vital to the early period of the New 
Order and how the patronage worked were these generals (Borsuk & Chng, 2014) 
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One of large-scale projects emanated from the alignment of interests with this 
group is the controversial Asahan project in which Japanese government prepared “a 
package deal” for Japanese company. Under a Master Agreement for Asahan 
Hydroelectric and Aluminium Project, Japanese government reportedly prepared grant 
and loan for 12 Japanese investors for equity participation totalling 411 billion Yen. 
Such large-scale project was facilitated by the influential “Indonesia lobby in Japan” 
including Nakajima Shinzaburo (businessmen), Kimura Takeo (a conservative politician 
and head of Cabinet Secretariat), and Fukuda Takeo (Ministry of Finance) who closely 
connected with Soedjono Humardani. He is known as the spiritual guru of Soeharto as 
well as “military entrepreneur”, his position as a presidential adviser, without a formal 
ministerial role, placed him in an advantageous location from which to become involved 
not only in domestic affairs, but in international ones as well, in bids to achieve 
economic stabilization and development. This indirectly claimed by Soedjono, “the idea 
to establish an alternate channel for oil exports to Japan, was raised around the end of 
1971, when I went to Tokyo and talked with Fukuda, as well as Tanaka” (as cited in 
Malley, 1989, p.57). Loan pledged after ad-hoc consultation between the government of 
Japan and Indonesia, has been provided for relatively large projects, including energy 
infrastructure (OECF, 1992, p. 140). Relatedly, during four years from 1973 to 1976, 
Japan offered 110 billion yen loan in total to Indonesia Pertamina that was headed by 
Ibnu Sutowo for developing and/or rehabilitating 40 oil and gas projects (CIA, 1984; 
Nishihara, 1976; Shiraishi, 1997).  
Accordingly, the third camp is well-connected ethnic Chinese conglomerates. 
Powerful business conglomerates, in particular ethnic Chinese, partnering with Japanese 
trading companies, often took part in wielding its economic power to get the 
government to push for specific loan requests (Doner, 1997; Peter J Katzenstein & 
Rouse, 1993). Well-connected Chinese conglomerates represented business groups such 
as Astra, Panin, Sofyan Wanandi, Nyo Han Siang (Bankers Club Indonesia), Prayogo 
Pangestu, Arief Husni, Salim and Bob Hassan. Japan OECF played a critical role in the 
forestry project and associated infrastructure such as electricity and transport facilities 
that were connected with ethnic Chinese big business. While loan information remained 
confidential, more than 70 percent of OECF general forestry project loans went to 
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Indonesia and trading companies likely received OECF loans during the period of 1963 
to 1981 (Dauvergne, 1997). In addition, although business alliance intertwining ethnic 
Chinese business and Japanese multinationals had no direct influence in formulating a 
broader infrastructure cooperation master plan, very often industrial projects these 
alliances set up continuously reshaped the content of infrastructure roadmap. For 
example, the yen loan has been directed for economic infrastructure in areas where 
Japanese investment reached economic viability. The alliance became the enabling 
factor to link the infrastructure development with the aid trinity (sanmiitai) that would 
be explain in more detail in the following section. 
Next camp consisted of nationalist and social-oriented economics, 
engineering-trained bureaucrats, and pribumi businessmen. The surge in oil prices from 
1973 saw the replacement of market forms of regulation with the code of conduct at 
Soeharto’s personal discretion. It catapulted a core group of Chinese and some generals 
to wealth and prominence as the collusion produced important joint ventures between 
the Chinese and both Japanese and American multinationals (Robison, 1986). 
Undeniably, the imposition of the compulsory use of local partners for foreign investors, 
control by the state of all contracts for infrastructure projects, lucrative initiatives in oil 
and mineral extraction and the state's control over credit, benefited the large Chinese 
corporations, who faced no competition from foreign or pribumi capital (Chua, 2008). 
Speaking in a similar vein several months later, Mohammad Sadli (1974:18), the first 
Chairman of BKPM stated:  
 
“In the mind of the political public in Jakarta, the honeymoon with foreign 
investment and foreign aid is apparently over. The economic progress of the 
last five years has produced the not so palatable social by-product of 
conspicuous consumption, a widening gap between the rich and poor, charges 
of corruption, etc. Since foreign aid and foreign investment have been 
important elements in the policies of the government, these are now blamed for 
accentuating the distortions. The criticism is unfair but the mood is there….and 
the mood in Jakarta is also present in other capital cities in Asia.” 




Following the Malari affairs1, what have been proven is that the emergence of 
this group – nationalist economics, pribumi businessmen, and engineering-trained 
bureaucrats – as the dominant force that began to reshape government investment 
policies that were used to take side on ethnic Chinese. Oil wealth and the increasing 
influence of the economic nationalist paved the way for more affirmative action in the 
early 1980s. Accordingly, several presidential decrees – the Kepres 14 in 1979 which 
was amended and reissued as the Kepres 14A and Kepres 10 in 1980 – gave the ‘weak 
economic group’, a code phrase for indigenous businessmen, a set of priority in 
obtaining certain government contracts (Schwarz, 2000). Consequently, the Kepres 10 
in 1980 paved the way further for the group to have more bargaining powers. For big 
government projects reiterated in the regulation, a new team was set up to decide on 
project allocations. Team 10, as it would be known, was headed by Sudharmono, the 
powerful state secretary, and from 1983, chairman of the ruling party Golkar. In 1983, 
Sudharmono’s protégé Ginanjar Kartasasmita was appointed as the Vice Chairman of 
Team 10 (Chua, 2008; Winters, 1996). The recipient of Team 10’s beneficence had 
salient characteristics, among others, they were selected for their political and personal 
proximity to powerful officials in the presidential palace, Sudharmono and Ginanjar, the 
office of state secretary (Setneg) as well as for their instrumental value, such as securing 
support in geographical areas or among social groups where the Soeharto regime felt 
insecure – in which the larger pribumis became active (Schwarz, 2000). Among others, 
the prominent pribumi businessmen comprised Aburizal Bakrie, Fadel Muhammad, 
Iman Taufik, Jusuf and Ahmad Kalla, Fahmi Idris, Suryo Palo, Bambang Rachmadi, 
Agus Kartasasmita, Abdul Latief, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, and Subagio 
Wiryoatmodjo. Two important political vehicles for them to get the government-related 
contracts were the Association of Young Indonesian Businessmen (HIPMI) and the 
                                                       
1 While the New Order government has put more weight on Japan in aims to facilitate the government’s stability and 
development-oriented domestic policy, in mid-January 1972, both government were tremendously shaken by the 
urban violence, as the so-called Malari affairs, that broke out in Jakarta during Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka 
Kakuei’s visit. Much of the public protest had based on anti-Japanese sentiment as the Japanese economic expansion 
have come to symbolize a whole variety of economic grievances, of particular notes when Japanese have partnered 
with ethnic Chinese businessmen at the expense of local indigenous Indonesian businessmen. 
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Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) that were closely allied with 
the economic nationalist camp. They had ensconced in a cocoon of their main cabinet 
patron, Ginanjar Kartasasmita, who had assumed the portfolio of Minister of Mines and 
Energy in March 1988 (Rosser, 2002). 
Ginanjar Kartasasmita a nationalist figure who gave the strong advocate of 
indigenous business and a long-time protégé of Soeharto, was educated in Japan and 
regarded as the bridge (kakehashi) between Indonesia and Japan (Kartasasmita, 2013, 
p.466). In 1993, the triumph of the engineers over the first camp, technocrats, 
culminated when Soeharto set up a new Cabinet. A number of ministerial position used 
to be filled by Widjojo’s porteges, were transferred to other groups, most notably the 
nationalist-engineers. The hardest hit for the technocrats was they had lost positions in 
Bappenas, a strategic post exclusively retained by the economists for years (Amir, 2012). 
This position was occupied by Ginandjar whose previous positions were Chairman of 
Investment Coordinating Body (BKPM) and the Minister of Mines and Energy. 
Ginandjar was somewhat receptive to the trickle-down mechanism that in the 
economists’ perspective would presumably distribute wealth evenly in Indonesian 
society. He envisioned cooperation between private sector and government for 
infrastructure projects and put in a lot of efforts on the development of coal-power 
generating plants in which Japanese private sectors were involved, such as Paiton in 
East Java that is often referred to as the first and largest of private projects; Tanjung Jati 
in Central Java; and Cilegon in West Java (Wells & Ahmed, 2006). Ginandjar also 
initiated the development of large-scale geothermal power plants that unfortunately 
many were delayed by the 1998 crisis. Business representatives and policy makers I 
have spoken to in Japan and Indonesia, reminisced how Ginandjar acted as a ‘balancer’ 
between the very rational technocrats and irrational military figures and elites, in order 
to ensure the smooth transition of the project plan to the implementation., Ginandjar 
(2013:102) also admitted how he maintained policy dialogue with Japanese counterpart, 
“…I sought the advice of foreign business communities such as the Jakarta Japan Club 
and the American Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia. They gave me valuable input. 
Based on their inputs as well as from our own Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (KADIN) and sectoral business associations, we formulated investment 
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policies that were business-friendly but that also encapsulated our agenda promoting 
domestic industry and small and medium enterprises”.   
A seamless web of competing interest has simply converted into such a policy 
network or linkage between industry, bureaucrats, political elites and other interests 
group under a big umbrella of Soeharto’s development doctrine. Ultimately, this 
constellation had forged alliances to promote the success of projects as well as to 
respond to the wider effects of alliances on overall developmental trajectories. This 
provided technical solutions to tackle ‘time inconsistencies’ – the embeddedness of 
economic action in social structures with Soeharto as the highest authority in policy 
making. In time of crisis, Soeharto would have the technocrats group to consult with 
and turn to nationalist and engineering-based bureaucrats group once he want to 
reconsolidate the power. Consequently, both institutionalization and informalization 
enabled Japanese infrastructure regime to work simply as “cohesive force”, starting 
from the planning, implementation, to the evaluation from the viewpoint of long-term 
perspective and inter-sectoral coordination. On the one hand, JICA formulated a master 
plan covering the specific field of infrastructure in accordance with the target set in the 
Repelita and the METI’s White Paper, while OECF also listed priority projects and 
analyzed measures for financing. Later, each project listed in the master plan was 
implemented by means of existing scheme. On the other hand, Japanese private sector 
can also first identify the project and then develop it in coordination with various other 
public as well as private sector interests (Kinoshita, 1986). While JICA provided 
technical cooperation for EPC scheme, at the end of coordination stage, private sectors 
would take in charge of their respective sector. To some extent, these firms also assisted 
Indonesia in mounting a financial package for the implementation of a project, 
identifying which components would be eligible for JICA or OECF financing. The firms 
may assist in pulling together financing for big infrastructure projects through 
partnerships with banks or other firms, or both (see Indonesia Country Assistance Study 
Group, 1999; The Government of Japan, 2004).  For example, the 6th Five Year 
National Development Plan (1994-1998) attached importance on the port development 
with due attention to the regional development of Eastern Indonesia to redress the 
regional economic disparity. Thus, in 1994, the Indonesian Government formulated an 
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integrated master plan for sea transportation, namely the Study on Integrated 
Modernization Plan for Sea Transportation in Eastern Indonesia Vol. I assisted by JICA 
which comprehensively guides the development of 17 transit ports and 85 small ports in 
Eastern Indonesian up to the year 2005 (JICA, 1994). Considering the urgency of the 
development need, Kupang and Bitung were placed in the First Package category and 
built with use of Japanese Yen loan, amounting 5,250 million yen of OECF loan 
package in 1996. In addition, the developments of ferry terminals consisting of 8 
maritime routes (including 6 routes in eastern Indonesia) were developed by ODA loan 
based on the examination result of ‘National Ferry Network Development Master Plan’ 
conducted in 1992 (JICA, 2010b)  
The infrastructure regime is never static. After the reformasi, Indonesia has 
become the world’s third largest democracy. The process of democratization reaffirmed 
and amplified the position of subnational groups and elites, producing a new set of 
conditions for the “politics of development” which has added nuances to the 
infrastructure development in Indonesia. Repelita-based master plan has lost relevance 
at power relations in Indonesia. There is no final arbiter of policy, while change in the 
preference of a decision maker occurs between an initial policy promise and a policy 
decision that takes place later, as Adam Schwarz suggests, “the president’s own 
‘unstructured, ad hoc style’” (Schwarz, 2016). Infrastructure regime during the Soeharto 
era was simply nurtured by the political settlement – how Japan unified the process of 
capital accumulation and of policy formulation in infrastructure development by 
maintaining “equilibrium of interests” with those aforementioned camps. In contrast, 
Indonesia’s democratization over the past two decades has entailed a much more 
complex power relations. Institutionally, it becomes complex, fragmented, if not 
contradictory. There is a shared sense of disillusionment with current political 
developments, consensus that decentralization does not necessarily bring local 
democratization (Heryanto & Hadiz, 2005, p.262) nor regional autonomy politics is 
aloof from constant power struggles among local elites and levels of government (Hadiz, 
2003) and greater opportunity for corruption and mismanagement of funds (Aspinall & 
Kilinken, 2010). Social divisions along ethnic and religious lines, labor and markets, 
vested political interests of different scale of actors are no longer suppressed as they had 
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been under Soeharto regime, which thus have a wide scope to intervene in the 
policy-making and leverage development activities.  
Having said that, it is impossible without carefully understanding tensions 
originating inside the state’s boundaries – how to adept with the socio-political 
dimension of state capture in which old and new political formations coexist, how 
conflict-ridden infrastructure development is narrated, and how different levels of 
interests are mediated in Indonesia.  Political challenges resulting from the 
democratization is twofold – Bappenas and decentralization. During Soeharto’s 
administration, Bappenas, whose key figures had strong connection with Japan, was a 
powerful superagency with combined authority over development budget, planning, and 
foreign aid mobilization. At times, the chairman of Bappenas also doubled as the 
Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs. Yet, now it tells different story in Indonesia 
(Lindsey & Butt, 2018). Followed by the State Development Planning System Law 
(Law No.25/2004), the new system transferred all the budgeting functions to Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) and had Bappenas specialize in planning and evaluation (Government 
of Indonesia, 2004) . Overlapping authorities between Coordinating Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and the Economic Affairs; Indonesia SOEs “crowding out” 
infrastructure sectors; the ever-changing regulations; have added complexities further.  
What become more problematic is, the conflicting nature of liberalization and 
nationalism has been so apparent in Indonesian infrastructure development. On the one 
hand, the traditional principle of public interest is that the public nature of infrastructure. 
Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has often been used as 
a political means to impede further liberalization. One of paragraphs reiterates that 
sectors of production that are important for the country and affect the life of the people 
shall be under the powers of the State. The Article has invoked public perception that 
infrastructure must be built by government (referring to state-owned utilities providing 
the infrastructure services), provided at subsidized prices, and come with an economic 
focus on self-reliance. On the other hand, government alone could not fix infrastructure 
deficit and thus the financing should come to permit majority foreign equity stakes in 
infrastructure sectors. As an example, during Jokowi’s first five-year term, 
infrastructure projects comprising 15 airports, 1000 km of new toll roads, more than 
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3000 km of railways, 24 seaports, and 35,000 megawatts worth of power plants are 
expected to cost a total of 4,800 trillion rupiah (U$ 355 billion). However, state budget 
can only fund less than half of the total costs (Salna, 2018). As such, what tends to 
happen is that populist-and nationalist-ridden infrastructure policy become pitted 
against outward-oriented one.  
There has to be a financing distribution mechanism that stops people from 
holding the government hostage over critical infrastructure projects. Particularly since 
the Yudhoyono’s administration, the PPP (Public Private Partnership) has been 
introduced as a scheme for the infrastructure investment recovery. Presidential 
Regulation No. 67/2005 was put in force to set out the platform for the national PPP 
scheme. The Presidential Regulation, coupled with the Ministry of Finance Regulation 
No. 38/2006, provide government support for the undertakings of infrastructure 
development by the private sector. Three government organizations were also 
established to promote the PPP scheme, comprising the “National Committee on 
Acceleration of Infrastructure Provision” (KKPPI), “Risk Management Committee on 
Infrastructure Provision” (RMCIP), and “Risk Management Unit” (RMU). Main tasks 
of the KKPPI are to set up the framework of Public Service Obligation (PSO), act as 
liaison between PSO and PPP, and to establish compliances of PSO and PPP (ERIA, 
2015; Kim et al, 2018).  
What has been implicated to Japanese infrastructure regime is that, many 
projects suspended due to the crisis were subsumed under the scheme of PPP. However, 
it could not be easily adjusted both politically and economically due to several reasons. 
First, Bappenas, despite functioning as the promoter of PPP, has limited role. Before the 
reform and decentralization started, majority infrastructure projects were executed either 
by central, or by direct appointment to SOEs and/or private firms and Regional 
Planning Agencies (Bappeda) followed the direction. Now the various Bappeda 
operating on lower tiers of government do not any longer primarily report to Bappenas 
but to their respective local authorities (see Government of Indonesia, 2004). Second, 
decentralization – diverse popular movements and local claimants to state power. 
Decentralization has led to greater transformation occurring in intra-state that 
significantly defined policy. On sub-national government level, though there are 
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proposals currently that at least 20 percent of their expenditure should be investment, 
there have been drawbacks in the realization of expenditure. It is important to note that 
sub-national government is not obliged to follow central government rules for PPPs 
(Ray & Ing, 2016). Infrastructure now, can be a crucial factor causing and enabling the 
resistance of sub-national groups against subjection under centralized state authority, or 
forging cooperation between sub-national groups with centralized state authority, 
depending upon political context. The group does not always match with central’s 
vision of development and designated projects. These local actors and interest groups 
found ways to informally evade imposed reforms and infrastructure roadmap; rendering 
most of the supposed successes of roadmap an illusion. These factors have led to the 
major limitation in which implementation has been very uneven, both horizontally 
across different parts of the central government and vertically between the central and 
subnational government levels. With projects unable to be carried out without a 
multitude of approvals and issuance of licenses across different levels of government 
points to a key shortcoming of central government institutional reforms. As such, the 
institutionalization of infrastructure deals through a “master plan”, just as done by JICA 
or OECF together with the Bappenas in the past, does not necessarily conclude a project 
contract.  
In respond to such power fragmentation, what we have been witnessing is that 
there have been considerable changes in Japanese approach for infrastructure 
development in Indonesia. Reflected in JICA’s works, Japan rather priorities specific 
program so as to ‘unify’ fragmented interests among sub-national government before 
particular project is assessed. Over the past two decades, there have been numerous 
programs carried out by JICA to make decentralization work, for example, the South 
Sulawesi Regional Development Program, the North-East Indonesia Regional 
Development Program, and so forth. That is to say, aside from large-scale project 
funded by JICA’s STEP loan that will be elaborated in the following section, 
Japan-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation has been subjected to ‘intangible services’ 
and policy-based, such as preparatory survey for the PPP scheme, Project for PPP 
Network Enhancement, Project on Capacity Development for Trade-related 
Administration, preparation for renewable energy projects (see JICA, 2017, 2018). It 
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seems that Japanese agencies and private sectors tend to look for ‘contractual 
perspective’ amidst ad-hoc governmentality in Indonesia. There has been an attempt to 
promote formal and legal dimension of relationship that binds the government and 
private partner together while together with Japanese agencies enforce 
partnership-focused perspective that mainly emphasizes the social dimension of the 
relationship, characterized with mutual commitment and trust.  
Worth noting, throughout democracy period, the most apparent 
re-institutionalization of infrastructure development alongside Japan’s involvement is 
the Jabodetabek MPA strategic plan, while JICA has carried out the Master Plan Study 
for Establishing Priority Area for Investment and Industry in Jabodetabek Area in the 
Republic of Indonesia since May 2011 (CMEA, 2012; Fukuda Yasuo, 2014; JICA, 
2012). The MPA has been regarded as a derivative of the development policy of 
Yudhoyono’s administration, namely the Master Plan for the Acceleration and 
Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development (MP3EI) and the 2009-2014 
Medium-Term National Development Plan (RPJMN). The RPJMN plan has two key 
factors, namely acceleration and expansion of Indonesian development to boosting 
value added of the prime economic sectors, developing infrastructure and energy supply, 
as well as the development of human resources and science and technology. The MP3EI 
itself is not intended to replace the RPJMN, rather functions as a complementary 
working document for the above-mentioned development plans. Eight main programs 
and 22 main economic activities have been identified. In addition, six economic 
corridors are identified as growth centers and are expected to boost economic 
development throughout the nation. Investors and business can therefore clearly choose 
their desire sectors and preferred regions according to their business interest and 
specialization in accordance with the key economic drivers of the six corridors 
(Bappenas, 2011). In 2012, the Jabodetabek MPA was approved by the Steering 
Committee and Technical Committee. The committee consisted of the governments of 
both countries and relevant organizations. Approximately 1 trillion yen out of 3.4 
trillion yen for the MPA was expected to come from international monetary cooperation, 
including Japan’s ODA. The MPA framework included the North-South line by the 
Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) System which is the first subway in Indonesia, the 
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Java-Sumatra Interconnection Transmission Line, Cilamaya Port (later replaced by 
Patimban Port), and the Jabodetabek Railway Capacity Enhancement Project and other 
Fast Track Projects that were expected to utilize PPP mechanism (JICA, 2012).  
The way the utilization of ODA as well as of PPP scheme narrated within the 
MPA has utterly reshaped the Japanese infrastructure regime whereby trust has been 
promoted and interests at the national level were harmonized and coordinated. On the 
one hand, considering the lack of coherent strategy for planning and implementation 
during the first period of Yudhoyono’s administration (2004-2009), the use of ODA and 
cherry-picking specific projects allowed central government as well as Japan to narrow 
competing interests and maintain coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Bappenas. On the other side, the MPA cashed in on the role of intergovernmental 
cooperation to bring conclusion contracts for suspended PPP projects that inherently 
depended on governmental support. The MPA thus enabled structural inclusion of 
private sectors to ‘bootstrapping’ the highly risky PPP scheme for specific sectors that 
have been deregulated and backed by off-take purchaser. To offer an example, one of 
Fast Track Projects listed in the MPA is the Central Java Coal-Fired Power Plant that is 
the first PPP project based on an Indonesian Presidential Decree. The 2,000 MW power 
plant has been billed as the largest project of its kind in Southeast Asia and cost 
approximately U$ 4 billion largely financed by the JBIC. J-Power and Itochu are major 
players in the projects and will operate as an independent power purchaser (IPP) with 
the Indonesian State Electricity Company (PLN) as off-taker. Batang project is 
originally part of the 10 model projects identified in the 2006 Infrastructure Summit and 
signed on 6 October 2011. This implies that this project is the only project to date that 
has passed through PPP cycle specified in terms of the Presidential Regulation No.67 of 
2005, No.13 of 2010 and No.56 of 2011 (Amindoni, 2016a; Koji & Hiroshi, 2017).  
 
2.2 China: Fragmentation and ʻde-institutionalizationʼ 
 
 Throughout much of the history of Sino-Indonesian relations, the relationship 
between Beijing and Jakarta has been fragile and prone to sudden changes. Vehemently 
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anti-imperialist and pro-non-alignment, Chinese and Indonesian foreign policies were 
largely compatible throughout much of the late-1950s and 1960s. However, following 
the ascension of President Suharto, relations collapsed and would only slowly improve 
up until his fall (Sukma, 1999). Since the dawn of the Reformasi era, relations have 
significantly improved, particularly as Indonesia looked for financial assistance. 
Interestingly, unlike Japan, the economic cooperation has its roots from 
multilateral-based relations instead of bilateral relations. In 1997, within the framework 
of IMF, China provided financial assistance to a number of Southeast Asian countries, 
including Indonesia in the form of credit and loans. It offered US$500 million to the 
International Monetary Fund’s US$43 billion bailout package, as well as providing 
US$200 million in export credits to help Indonesia rebound its economy (Fitriani, 2018; 
Sukma, 2009). Furthermore, at the second ASEAN+3 Summit in 1998, Vice President 
Hu Jintao proposed a meeting of deputy finance ministers and central bank 
vice-governors of ASEAN members together with Japan, China, and South Korea. This 
proposal led to an ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ meeting in Hanoi in March 1999, that 
later was institutionalized as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000 (China 
MoFA, 1998; Ku, 2006).  
Although the ASEAN-led regional cooperation has led Indonesia to pursue a 
deeper bilateral relations with China, infrastructure cooperation – either in the form of 
concessional loan or investment – had never been institutionalized and been published 
in a detailed plan. The seemingly-formalization of Indonesia-China infrastructure 
cooperation has its roots from the first Indonesia-China Energy Forum, that was 
established in Bali in September 2002, during which six MoU worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars of cooperation in oil, mining, and power sectors were established. On 
the surface, the forum has led to a growing number of Chinese companies searching for 
energy-investment opportunities in Indonesia (“China, Indonesia Hold First Energy 
Forum,” 2002; “China, Indonesia sign MoU on energy cooperation,” 2006). In 2002, 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought a Spanish oil company’s 
assets in Indonesian oil fields at a price of U$850 million, which made it become 
Indonesia’s largest offshore oil producer (Dhume, 2002). In April 2004, Sinopec 
purchased American Devon Energy’s oil and gas assets in Indonesia as its foray into the 
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Indonesian energy exploration and development market (IEA, 2014).  By 2008, it 
controlled over 33 gas fields and 85 offshore facilities, and produced crude oil from 420 
wells. One of the biggest deals also included the sale of natural gas to the Chinese 
province of Fujian in 2002, with agreed sales prices of US$2.4 per ton for 20 years 
(Zhao & Sambodo, 2018).  
Furthermore, under the administration of then President Yudhoyono, the 
relationship was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership in 2005, which saw enhancements 
in economic, cultural, and security ties. The relationship was upgraded again to 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013 (Xiao, 2018). Accordingly, President 
Jokowi, known with his ambitious Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) program, has been 
striving to materialize the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership into more concrete 
outcomes particularly in the maritime infrastructure sector. Jokowi’s administration has 
also been considering a new platform of Sino-Indonesian Maritime Partnership based on 
two strategies – Xi Jinping’s BRI and Jokowi’s GMF – that deemed highly 
complementary to each other (Qiu, 2019) .  
According to an article written by van der Eng (2017), although China is not the 
largest donor in Indonesia, the Chinese aid still accounted for 86 completed contracted 
projects in Indonesia, or an average of US$ 2.5 billion in aid per year. Referring to Bank 
Indonesia (2018) statistics, the country’s debts to China have more doubled under 
Jokowi. Excluding loans from Hong Kong, they amounted to $ 16.7 billion in the 
mid-2018, 110.5 per cent more than when Jokowi took oath at the end of 2014. Many 
pundits, including van der Eng (2017) interpreted this figure as the outcome of Jokowi’s 
pragmatic policy towards China. In fact, many projects carried out during Jokowi’s 
administration were emanated from a broader bilateral framework under Yudhoyono’s 
administration that has been played out by different levels of government and business 
entities. On the one hand, in terms of foreign policy, a Strategic Partnership inked 
during Yudhoyono administration, were perceived as Yudhoyono’s hedging strategy – 
preferred stronger ties to the United State without undermining relations with China. 
However, in real practices, the bilateral cooperation framework as well as the 
China-Indonesia Energy Forum that has been held many times, have been opening up a 
‘playing field’ for political and economic forces in Indonesia to speed up capital 
27 
accumulation and leverage economic opportunities through infrastructure development.  
There have been many projects planned across different subnational entities that 
simply led to “de-institutionalization” of infrastructure cooperation. The reason behind 
the “de-institutionalization” is the power fragmentation taking shape both in China and 
Indonesia. As China entered into Indonesian infrastructure market in the aftermath of 
reform, as explained before, technocracy and the Bappenas were no longer a privileged 
source of ideas and policies. Economic policy-making has become the shared but 
contested terrain of young professionals, political party representatives, politicians with 
business background, as well as politician with technocratic backgrounds (Takashi, 
2014). Likewise, state transformation in Indonesia also took shape just at the time when 
China also launched going out policy in which state power and authority have 
fragmented and decentralized with many national and subnational agencies enjoying 
greater autonomy, including in international affairs and economic cooperation, 
dissolving the traditional foreign affairs. The commercial imperatives driving the 
Chinese-led projects overseas has been reinforced by the going out strategy, whereby 
SOEs, subnational government, and large private companies have been encouraged and 
supported by the Chinese government to invest abroad (Jones & Zou, 2017).  
One important implication of the democracy in Indonesia and China’s going out 
policy is that these sub-national entities have taken on “development” role that was once 
monopolized by national central governments even though there were government-level 
cooperation frameworks provided to broaden and deepen policy dialogue and 
cooperation in trade and infrastructure. In some cases, under a 
government-to-government framework, the MOFCOM actively led and pushed policy 
banks such as EXIM Bank and CDB to provide loans for overseas projects and assigned 
particular companies or provincial government for the project. Consequently, those 
banks exhibited higher risk tolerance than other lenders about certain commercial aspect 
of the projects (Zhang & Smith, 2017). However, more often than not, the increasingly 
decentralization of state-based economic activities in China has impelled the local 
governments to compete internationally for project concessions and/or international 
investments. In China, this is observable as the “retreat of the state” where provincial 
authorities have taken the lead in the fiscal matters, including the provision of 
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infrastructure and the investment. These dynamics are shaped by what Chen (2001) and 
Fang (2005) coined as the “under-central diplomacy” (zhizhongyingwaijiao) – a 
Chinese style para-diplomacy, whereby Chinese MOFCOM (Ministry of Commerce) 
selects provincial authorities. The officials would thus have the advantage of obtaining 
first-hand information on Chinese projects on the ground and of expanding their links 
on the trade and investment as well (Zhang & Smith, 2017). The under-central 
diplomacy has paved way for alignment of interests among different levels of 
government in Indonesia and capital forces, such as ethnic Chinese network and 
organizations (see Chong, 2018, p.82).  
Different from Japan, be it loan or investment project, China never have an 
integrated master plan or a coordinated efforts and policy among line agencies, both 
intra-state relations and interstate relations. From technical side, the reason behind it is 
the absence of inter-governmental quasi-governmental organizations like JICA and 
JBIC that have sorted out and resolved competing interests among key ministries in 
Japan. The quasi-governmental corporations have supplied and mobilized private sector 
resources under a well-coordinated plan and acted as a bridge between Japanese 
stakeholders and Indonesian line ministries in order to achieve consensual deal in 
central level. Whereas, in China, almost all economic-related activities is centered 
around MOFCOM while provincial government is often given the discretion to decide 
on the details and schedule of project implementation (Huang & Wilkes, 2011; OECD, 
2008).  
Regarding the practices, China’s infrastructure regime allows the flexibility and 
self-interpretation and opens up to “negotiation” of state directives. Provincial 
governments across China promote local enterprises (Jones & Zou, 2017; Su, 2012), 
ranging from industrial infrastructure, energy infrastructure, to tourism infrastructure 
and they can directly approach local government in Indonesia. Based on author’s recent 
observation, very often, it turned out that these provincial governments designed many 
programs and reached out Indonesian local governments – by passing existing political 
arrangements and try to substitute new forms of ‘consensual deal’ with local elites. The 
regional governments in Indonesia whose performance legitimacy is built based on 
development premise for their constituents have been prone to take own initiative to 
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engage international stakeholders. These provincial and district governments have 
extensive regulatory authority over local matters and hold the authorization rights for 
enterprises in their province and district, such as a mining service business license, a 
building permit (izin mendirikan bangunan), and an environmental permit (izin 
lingkungan), site plan license (izin tata ruang) (PWC Indonesia, 2016 ). Not rarely, head 
of regency in Indonesia whose interest are far from the geopolitical mindset, made an 
official visit to Beijing to look for potential investor – enforcing a bottom-up approach 
for which unsolicited projects are submitted to local government who later will lobby 
the central agency for the ‘project status’. For example, the then Governor of Central 
Kalimantan, Agustin Teras Narang signed an MoU with China Overseas Engineering 
Group, a subsidiary of the state-owned China Railway Engineering Corps (CREC), on 
the construction of a 517 km railway, connecting Murung Raya to a port in Seruyan 
District via Palangkaraya. In 2014, a tender was eventually awarded to the consortium 
of CREC and two Indonesian companies (Morishita, 2015; Setiawan, 2018). The project 
was constructed through a consortium model of a PPP scheme. The local government 
also had more leverage due to a new Railway Law (Law No.23/2007) that reiterated that 
provincial governments have the authority to issue construction and operation permits 
for railway network connecting districts and cities within a single province with 
approval from the central government (“Central Kalimantan Coal Railway Network will 
be built by 2015,” 2012).  
Another turning point of the “deinstitutionalization” is the MP3EI. While Japan 
used the MP3EI as the main basis to set up an integrated master plan, namely the said 
MPA Jabodetabek, China instead diversified its infrastructure business through the 
national plan and put attempts to leverage policy from the bottom-up. To address a 
backlog in infrastructure investment, the government of Indonesia launched the MP3EI 
2011-2015. It reflected Indonesian government’s commitment to increase investment in 
all types of infrastructure that is particularly related to connectivity in Indonesia. 32 out 
of 79 infrastructure projects in the MP3EI were listed as PPP projects and it was not 
including other possible projects or unsolicited projects proposed by private sectors 
(OECD, 2012; Oxford Business Group, 2014, p. 277). In principle, part of the private 
sector’s contribution was expected to be in the form of PPP, accounting to 21 percent of 
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the infrastructure investment. The MP3EI was indeed a selling point for Coordinating 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Hatta Rajasa, during his visit to Beijing in 2011. Though 
nothing specific was detailed, Hatta secured the public backing of Wen Jiabao and 
Chinese investors to support the master plan. The Chinese government reportedly even 
set up a working group to coordinate Chinese investors seeking opportunities in 
Indonesia under the master plan. In May 2011, Wen Jiabao visited Jakarta and 
concluded deals covering 1 billion dollar in preferential buyer’s credit – the largest 
amount China has ever provided for a foreign country – together with U$ 8 billion in 
financing contracts for Chinese companies investing in Indonesian infrastructure and 
large-scale industrial projects (“Indonesia-China Set Up Working Group for MP3EI,” 
2011).  
In relations to the MP3EI, it is worth reminding ourselves of the nature of 
infrastructure as economic goods that are derivative projects related to industrial they 
built. It is different from other commodity because it has spillover effect. MP3EI itself 
did not emphasize about infrastructure per se, rather production centers and 
mining-related infrastructure project. Among others, Special Economic Zone (Kawasan 
Ekonomi Khusus ‘KEK’) prepared for some areas in Indonesia to become new growth 
centers has attracted Chinese investors’ interest (Suryowati, 2014). The companies 
invested there would be offered fiscal incentives like tax holidays and tax allowances as 
well as on non-fiscal incentives. The KEK is expanded to twelve province across the 
country with each region offers different specialties, including Sei Mangkei, North 
Sumatra; Tanjung Lesung, Banten; Mandalika, East Nusa Tenggara; Palu, Central 
Sulawesi; Bitung, North Sulawesi; Morotai, North Maluku; Tanjung Api-api, South 
Sumatra; Maloy Batuta Trans Kalimatan (MBTK), East Kalimatan; Tanjung Kelayang, 
Bangka Belitung; Sorong, Papua; Arun Lhokseumawe, Aceh; and Galang Batang, Riau 
Islands (“Government to finalize two revised regulations on KEK,” 2019). China so far 
has expressed interest to build and manage Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Indonesia 
that spread over eight areas with each having a respective focus, such as palm oil 
processing and tourism. Of those zones, Sei Mangkei in North Sumatra and Maloy 
Batuta in East Kalimantan have already started operations that gained remarkable 
economic support from Chinese investors (“Sixth Economic Policy Package Indonesia: 
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Special Economic Zones,” 2015; Soeriaatmadja, 2015) 
Another consensual deals made in the local level have been pertained to the coal. 
During Yudhoyono’s administration, Indonesia-China bilateral coal trade was at one 
time sizeable enough to influence global market prices and production levels. However, 
as China increasingly dissociated itself from coal and Indonesia enacted policies to 
restrict the export of unprocessed mineral ores in 2009, trade began to decline. However, 
this has led to new pattern of infrastructure cooperation, notably through Chinese 
investment in Indonesia’s coal production infrastructure (Atteridge, Aung, & Nugroho, 
2018).  The 2009 Law on Mineral and Coal Mining stipulated that Indonesian coal 
producers must sell at least 21.47 percent of their coal to the domestic market as many 
policy-makers and nationalist supporter were concerned that Indonesia’s finite resources 
have been shipped overseas too quickly and cheaply (Springer, 2018). Hence, aside 
from building the mineral processing plants (i.e Morowali, that will be explained in the 
next section), Chinese companies started to enter IPP market – not only acted as mining 
shareholders, but also coal power plant developer (Zhou & Huang, 2010). One of 
notorious example is a 380 MW Celukan Bawang power plant in Bali. China Huadian 
as the 51 percent of strategic investor in the IPP project also took EPC role. Huadian’s 
subsidiary, the Huadian Hongkong Limited also built a coal steamed power called South 
Sumatra 8 in Tanjung Enim, Sumatra by setting up Huadian Bukit Asam Power, a joint 
venture with Bukit Asam, Indonesia state-owned coal mining companies (Kertaraharja, 
2015).  
On top of that, in spite of growing magnitude of China’s projects in Indonesia, 
very little is known about them and many of the details remain shrouded in secrecy. The 
amount of detail behind the high-level statement, such as the official announcement of 
project concession, is limited. It is also due partly to the fact that one of the striking 
features of Chinese infrastructure deals has been the existence of ‘straw man’ role 
played by subnational governments and local elites linked to them (see Mori, 2019; 
Rickards, 2014, p. 101). While there have been consensual agreements made at the 
central level, such as the GMF-BRI agreement (still under negotiation), they do not 
necessarily lead to the institutionalization of interests, just as in Japanese case. Broader 
alliances of sub-national entities as well as competing interests within intra-state as well 
32 
as interstate relations make us hard to conclude China-led infrastructure development in 
one term.  
 
3. Rationalization and Remaking the Narrative 
3.1 Japan: Rationalization and infrastructure  
Bearing the cooperation packages in mind, the allocation and impacts of Japan’s 
ODA have not been restricted to, nor entirely consistent with the lofty goals of enabling 
Indonesia ultimately to become less reliant on ODA. Instead Japan’s ODA for 
infrastructure projects has simultaneously been narrated and allocated in ways linked 
primarily with the rationalization of economy and adjusted with the political 
constellation and economic structure in Indonesia. During the New Order era, Japan’s 
infrastructural aid by and large aligned with the development priorities of Soeharto, thus 
subsidizing what Soeharto believed will bring about economic growth and political 
stability. Thus loan projects and Japanese investment were continuously directed to 
areas not threatening to, but rather enhancing, state and local capital under restrictive 
conditions stipulated by the state.  
Japanese infrastructural aid to Indonesia had constantly served the purpose of 
"rationalizing the Japanese economy” and converged with every phases of 
industrialization taking shape in Indonesia. The focus of the “rationalization” has 
changed over time, including the creation of a new market, the relocation of Japan’s 
sunset industries, the promotion of regional division of labor among Japanese firms 
investing in Southeast Asia, and the promotion of the "flying-geese” regional economy. 
The "structural inclusion” of commercial actors, like sogo sosha (trading companies) 
and consulting companies in the ODA policy-making has enabled Japan’s domestic 
interest groups to have direct access in assuring that those infrastructural aid could be 
well-linked with their trade and investment interests (Shimomura & Wang, 2012; 
Soederberg, 2001). As a consequence, Japanese infrastructure regime in Indonesia 
incorporated a much higher degree of rationalization and peculiarly adapted to 
Indonesia contradictory nature of economic policies – a mixed system of massive state 
regulation and liberalization, an old nationalist and the pro-market liberalization.  
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This can be divided into three phases. First, war reparation and trade-based 
infrastructure. The introduction of Japanese products in countries receiving reparations 
later brought about the demand for follows up orders as industrial projects under 
reparations were designed to be dependent on Japanese components and materials. 
Reparations provided a sizeable export market for products and the shosha acted as 
brokers for all the procurement transactions (Miyagi, 2018). During the 1970s, the 
“economic cooperation” network helped to coordinate domestic efforts at linking trade 
with infrastructure needs in Indonesia – relocating heavy and chemical industries 
affected by pollution constraints and higher oil prices. Government agencies encouraged 
private sector cooperation in large projects and helped in the provision of special tax 
exemptions, financing, and information. The network also helped to develop and 
support what were then considered “new forms of investment” such as turnkey contracts, 
and “lend-and import” contracts (Stevens, 1997). This network also nurtured Japanese 
vertical sub-contracting system. In this context, the Japanese system of sub-contracting 
is quite different; it is pyramidal and multi-layered with a dozen major final assemblers 
at the top which are served by primary (first tier) sub-contractors which are in turn 
supported by their own cohorts of secondary (second tier) sub-contractors which in turn 
farm out work down to the next rung of sub-contractors and so on. At the very bottom 
exist literally tens of thousands of the cottage-type, family-owned and operated, small 
production units (Kensy, 2001; Ozawa, 1991).   
The second phase is oil boom and the growing numbers of energy 
infrastructure. Settlements of war-related claims have given rise to two important 
legacies. One was the so-called request-basis method of decision making for 
determining the volume of ODA each year as well as the specific projects to be 
supported by ODA. The second was the deep involvement by Japanese business 
throughout the entire Japanese aid allocation and programming process including 
project identification, consultancy services, construction, and the procurement of 
equipment and other materials (Arase, 1994; Indonesia Country Assistance Study Group, 
1999). Not only restricted to infrastructure projects such as dam and electricity, these 
companies also had an extensive role in advancing Indonesian energy-related 
infrastructure projects. During the period, in a simple term, Indonesian energy policy 
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was the twofold one of strengthening the position of exportable energy sources as a 
foreign exchange earner and of developing non-exportable energy resources to fuel the 
economic growth of the country. During this period, there had been an increase in non 
IGGI/CGI Loan. The non IGGI/CGI Loan is pledged after ad hoc consultation between 
the government of Japan and Indonesia, has been provided for relatively large project 
such as energy development and industrial development, which shows strong 
relationship between two governments (and strong influence of informal relationship 
between Indonesia-Japan lobby group as explained before) (OECF, 1982). It included 
the Arun LNG development, Asahan Project, and later ASEAN-Japan Development 
Fund (see METI Japan, 2000). At the end of 1978, 86 % of Japan’s total direct 
investment in Indonesia took the form of loans rather than equity investment 
(Hardjosoekarto, 2001). The main reasons for this figure were investment in large 
projects involving Pertamina led by Ibnu Sutowo, Asahan led by Soedjono Humardani 
and other resource development projects that were usually made in non-IGGI loans 
(CIA, 1984; Malley, 1989; Shiraishi, 1997) 
The third phase of rationalization is the investment-based infrastructure. It was 
first captured in the 1987 MITI White Paper on the “New Asian Industrial Development 
Plan” (New AID Plan), which suggested the use of Japan’s ODA to facilitate both the 
relocation of selected Japanese businesses to Southeast Asia and a new international 
division of labor, especially in manufacturing among Japan and Asian countries. As 
outlined in the New AID Plan, Japan’s public sector would provide yen loans for 
infrastructure development and send technical experts to assist in coordinating the 
industrial plans of each regional country. Following the announcement of New AID 
Plan, the Japan International Development Organization (JAIDO) was established in 
1989 by Keidanren to provide financial assistance to Japanese SMEs that relocated their 
facilities abroad. Regardless of its private status, JAIDO received one-third of its fund 
from the OECF. JAIDO appeared to have a multiplicity of roles mapped out for it, but 
basically it was to marshal the private sector to take a stronger role in coordination with 
Japanese ODA efforts (Cronin, 1990; Hatch & Yamamura, 1996). For instance, if OECF 
yen loans were to be used for building a factory in a country, JAIDO would try to 
organize private sectors funds to build a road to the facility (Orr, 1990, p. 63). Under the 
35 
auspices of the METI, Japanese government working with the private sector set up 
bilateral ODA-coordinating committees in order to identify and select infrastructure or 
joint-private investment projects. Such symbiotic relationship would help move lower 
value-added Japanese manufacturing into lower cost Asian developing countries, or 
what mainstream views highlight as “a Japan-led flying geese regional order”. Indeed, 
in Indonesia, deregulation policy proposed by technocrats to transform economy heavily 
relying on state oil revenues into an industrialized-economy in 1980s coincided with 
Japan’s increasing needs to promote FDI outflows.  
During 1990s, there were prevailing arguments that the engagement of business 
interests in Japanese infrastructural aid diminished after the government began to untie 
its aid in the 1980s due to DACs critics (Ensign, 1992). However, the perception in fact 
was a cursory glance. The use of country-specific cooperation strategies devised by an 
expanded cadre of Japanese aid experts and the METI had eased the private sectors to 
select projects and brought with them vertical keiretsu network to enhance the 
integrative effect of Japanese business operations in the region, be it in pure 
infrastructure projects or industrial-related projects. For Indonesia, the targeted sectors 
were handicrafts, rubber-based products, electrical machinery, plastics, aluminum 
downstream products, and ceramics (Terry, 2014, p. 127). From this period forward, 
Japanese trading giants who had already established their capacity to set up business 
relations with host countries, functioned no more as procurement brokers, but as 
investors. By the time, the choices of projects for loan financing have been heavily 
oriented towards massive infrastructure projects that deemed beneficial for the targeted 
sectors, among others, industrial estates, transportation, ports, power plants, and 
telecommunications. Indeed, sosha was one of the driving forces behind it. For example, 
in 1990s, one of top trading company, Sumitomo, built and operated its first Industrial 
zone, the East Jakarta Industrial Park in Indonesia along with Thang Long Industrial 
Park in Vietnam (Sumitomo Corporation, n.d.). In June 1994, the Indonesian 
government implemented a deregulation package which opened up nine new sectors of 
the economy for private investment. These sectors included electricity, production and 
distribution, nuclear energy, shipping and telecommunication. In respond to the 
deregulation, Mitsui, took a lead in the first IPP (Independent Power Purchaser) projects 
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in Asia through the Paiton Project in Indonesia. Different from previous scheme of ODA 
that limited their role, through IPP, companies were responsible for the development, 
construction, and operation of the power project with their rights and power to delegate 
the sale of electricity in power purchasing agreements (PPA) (McBeth, 1993; Wells & 
Ahmed, 2006).  
Institutionalized government-business partnership made possible such 
investment-based infrastructure carried out in such coordinated efforts. A series of 
administrative reforms in 1990s were fixated on such investment-based infrastructure. 
In 1995, the Japanese government announced the OECF would be merged with the 
Exim Bank in 1999 to finance a considerable number of economic infrastructure 
projects in Asia – blurring borderline between ODA and other official flows. The 
decision in 1996 to allow OECF loans in connection with Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) or Build-Operate-Own (BOO) projects pointed in that direction  (JBIC, 1999).  
Moreover, in 1990, for the first time, JICA published its ODA Country Policy for 
Indonesia. Though human resources development and development in social sector in 
response to poverty reduction and uneven development were identified, but a closer 
look at the Country Policy reveals that ‘support for industrial restructuring’ and 
‘industrial infrastructure’ were the main concern (see The Committee on the Country 
Study for Japan’s ODA to Indonesia, 1994). For example, as of 1993, OECF spent 95.9 
billion yen on Surabaya urban development (to Surabaya City proper such as Gresik 
Thermal Power Expansion, Juanda Airport Improvement, communication networks 
improvement, city sewerage, etc) and 59.8 billion yen on Surabaya related development 
(to Surabaya city and neighbouring areas including East Java transmission line network, 
improvement of railway and communication networks, etc) totaling 221.9 billion yen. 
The integrated infrastructure project partially referred to the 1983 Urban Arterial Road 
System Development Study on Gerbangkertosusila region (Surabaya metropolitan area) 
and the Indonesian Ministry of Public Works’s plan that placed Surabaya City as a core 
of East Java in its regional development system (Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC), 1999; JICA, 2011). Yen loan for economic infrastructure has 
supported economies of scale in areas where Japanese investment have reached 
economic viability and allowed broader spillover effects into local economics. 
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However, the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis tested Japan’s ability as the leading 
donor and top investor in the region. In September 1997, with Presidential Decision 
(Keppres) No.39 Year 1997, the Indonesian government decided to delay the carrying 
out of 156 projects, equivalent to 65 percent of the total 241 priority projects. At the end 
of 1997, Indonesia’s foreign debt is estimated to have reached U$ 137.4 billion. Aside 
from Indonesia’s default on foreign debt that hurt the Japanese companies, the invisible 
exposures were the loan guarantees that some trading companies offered to commercial 
banks as a lure to get them to finance large infrastructure projects. Some exposures were 
also in the form of bridge loans to suppliers or their bankers for projects (one of 
vertically-keiretsu financing mechanism), particularly in billion dollar petrochemical 
and power plant projects that actually may never be finished or not economically 
feasible, let alone after the crisis (Sender, 1998). The 1997 Asia Financial Crisis brought 
a major blow to Indonesia and a big dip in the infrastructure investment. For example, 
in the IPP system, the electricity tariff PT PLN collected from customers was in 
Indonesian rupiah, while the power charge PT PLN as an off-taker needed to pay to IPP 
companies involving Japanese private sectors was denominated in US Dollars. Thus, 
when the value of the Indonesian Rupiah was depreciated, the Indonesian electricity 
sector went straight bankrupt and IPP companies had to bear the risk (Indonesia Country 
Assistance Study Group, 1999). 
After the period of economic and political crisis ended, under the administration 
of President Habibie, the government was encouraged to restore delayed strategic 
projects which deemed critical for the country’s development. Those projects included 
Kualanamu Airport in North Sumatera, the Kancil-Pejagan Toll Road that links West 
Java to Central Java, and the Solo-Semarang toll road in Central Java (Jegho, 2018). 
However, during the period, there has been de-industrialization trend and Indonesia lost 
its competitiveness over China and Thailand. The regulatory environment, state 
transformation, and institutional changes have discouraged Japan from resuming highly 
risky infrastructure projects. While under Soeharto regime the process and outcomes 
were largely predictable thanked to the narrowing coalitional interests (the said four 
camps), the ‘revolving door’ after crises inevitably resulted in shorter time horizons and 
uncertainty over a regime’s policy credibility. Policy-makers, JICA officials, and 
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business representative whom I interview highlight similar point of how their research 
units used to take in charge for “ODA-related business”, quickly after the 1998 reform, 
only did a mere “research things” due to declining confidence in the pre-1998 
mechanism of infrastructure policy and financing.    
 A new turning point of Japan-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation is the 
Special Terms for Economic Partnership (STEP) loans loan and Development Policy 
Loan (DPL), a new scheme introduced by JICA. The STEP loans launched in 2002 by 
JICA, for which procurement of Japanese goods and service including contractors and 
consultants for designated infrastructure projects are required. Through the scheme of 
STEP, Japan’s aggregate loans to Indonesia totaled about US$4 billion used for 
financing several large-scale projects (see following table). Under the STEP mechanism, 
JICA requires that the prime contractor shall be either of Japanese company or a joint 
venture (JV) composed of a Japanese company(ies) as the leading partner and a 
company(s) in a recipient country. Regarding the procurement, not less than thirty  
 
Table 1: Japan’s STEP Loan in Indonesia 
No. Project name 
 
 







1 Patimban Port Development Project  Transportation 2017 118,906 Japan tied 
2 Construction of Jakarta Mass Rapid 
Transit Project (MRT) II  
Transportation 2015 75,218 Japan tied 
3 Construction of Jakarta MRT I  Transportation 2009 48,150 Japan tied 
4 Construction of Jakarta MRT I Transportation 2009 48,150 General 
untied  
5 National Geo-Spatial Data 
Infrastructure Development Project  
Social services 2007 6,373 General 
untied 
6 Engineering Services for MRT Project Transportation 2006 1,869 Japan tied 
(consulting) 
7 Tanjung Priok Access Road II  Transportation 2006 26,620 Japan tied 
8 North Java Corridor Flyover Project Transportation  2005 4,287 Japan tied  
9 Tanjung Priok Access Road I Transportation 2005 26,306 Japan tied 




2004 5,866 Japan tied 
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Source: compiled by author, data from JICA ODA Loan Project Data 
percent (30%) of the total price of contract(s) (excluding consulting services) financed 
by a STEP loan shall be accounted for by either goods from Japan and services provided 
by a Japanese company or goods from Japan only, depending on the nature of the 
project (see JICA, 2018b). 
Whereas, the DPL is categorized into commodity loans but quite different from 
those for financing the balance of payment. The DPL rather is a loan based on policy 
and institutional improvement support as well as the fiscal policy support in accordance 
with Indonesia government’s National Medium-Term Development Plan. One of policy 
actions targeted is the strengthening of public-private consultation on trade and 
investment with the Ministry of Finance of Republic of Indonesia and the Coordination 
Ministry of Economic Affairs act as executing agencies (JICA, 2013). As of 2013, a 
total of $ 98,551 million yen of the DPL loan has been made since 2005. The latest 
phase of the loan, disbursed in 2013, was counted as ‘Connectivity Development Policy 
Loan’, that was used to support the policies and institutions pertaining to the 
aforementioned MPA Jabodetabek projects. Adding to this, other policy action also 
included the establishment of a Viability Gap Funding (VGF) as a policy for promoting  
   
Table 2: Japan’s Development Policy Loan for Indonesia 
Project Name Year of approval Amount (million yen) Interest rate Executing Agency 
DPL 1 2005 10,794 1.3 Ministry of Finance 
DPL 2 2006 11,729 1.5 Ministry of Finance 
DPL 3 2007 11,777 1.5 Ministry of Finance 
DPL 4 2008 22,080 0.7 Ministry of Finance, Coordinating 
Ministry of Economic Affairs  
DPL 5 2009 9,293 0.7 Ministry of Finance 
DPL 6 2010 8,997 0.7 Ministry of Finance 
DPL 7 2010 8,391 0.8 Ministry of Finance  
DPL 8  2013 15,490 0.8 Ministry of Finance  
Connectivity Development 
Policy Loan 
2013 19,848 0.8 Bappenas, Coordination Ministry 
of Economic Affairs 
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Source: compiled by author, data from JICA ODA Loan Project Data  
PPP projects and mobilizing private sector for acceleration of infrastructure delivery. In 
2012, Sumitomo-Mitsui also acquired a 14.9 percent share in state-owned Indonesian 
Infrastructure Finance (IIF) that was set up by the Indonesian government in 2010 in 
cooperation with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), and Germany DEG (ADB, 2017, p. 2). The IIF is expected to 
facilitate the development of infrastructure projects in five main sectors, namely power 
plants, toll roads, telecommunications, ports and drinking water (PWC Indonesia, 2014). 
Accordingly, the deal also established a business alliance between the Japanese bank 
and the IFF that would enable to two to cooperate on new infrastructure finance 
transaction in Indonesia. 
Put differently, the institutionalized relationships between Japanese public and 
private sectors have synergistic effects on the infrastructure regime. Albeit the absence 
of top leadership, the Japanese public and private actors comprised of major 
government ministries – MOFA, METI, MLIT, MOF –, government-affiliated 
organizations – JICA, JBIC, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) –, and 
business associations – Nippon Keidanren, Nissho (Japan Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), and Japan Jakarta Club – actively promote policy dialogues with the central 
and local governments in Indonesia and attempt to connect the economic rationalization 
with the policy harmonization.  
 
3.2 China : An uneven integration of capital  
Recent studies conclude that trinity model of Japanese ODA which combined 
trade, investment, and aid has been adopted by China. With low savings and no 
adequate financial institutions, the modernization and expansion of Chinese industries 
and infrastructure in the first decade of the reform process was financed notably by a 
series of key ODA loans from Japan, amounting to some USD 9 billion between 1979 
and 1995 (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1996, p. 67). It has prompted the unspoken 
rationale among Chinese policy makers, that if the ‘market approach’ that blurred 
boundaries between trade, investment, aid worked out well in China, it should also work 
when the time comes for China to be a donor or capital provider. In late 1980s, the 
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reform-oriented technocrats whose central policy agenda was to promote Chinese 
exports suggested an integrated aid policy that was deemed crucial to accelerate the 
linking up of various instruments of economic cooperation. Shortly afterwards, in 1992, 
Wu Yi, Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (later 
‘MOFCOM’) proposed the notion of ‘Da Jingmao’ (big strategy), stressing the 
integration of aid, trade and investment. ‘Da Jingmao’, was then authorized as a 
broad-based strategy of China’s foreign trade (Shimomura & Ping, 2015). 
To implement the strategy, China has established a wide range of such 
financing, funded from financial markets with implicit and explicit Chinese government 
guarantees, with the China Development Bank (CDB) and the EXIM Bank playing a 
‘public entrepreneurship’ role, supplying vision, action, and innovation at a scale and 
speed that recently outstripped OECD and Bretton Woods development institutions. The 
EXIM Bank created in 1994 as a policy bank (along with the CDB and the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China) saw the introduction of concessional loans, with interest 
subsidies funded from the general budget, to leverage commercially oriented flows. 
Such concessional loans were targeted for large and medium-sized infrastructure 
projects (Reilly, 2012; Zhang, 2011; Zhou & Xiong, 2017). The Department of Foreign 
Assistance under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation was 
responsible for determining the qualifications of the enterprises for bidding. The 
assigned contractor unit, be it SOEs or local government, had leverage over this system 
and enjoyed preferential loan provided by the bank (D. Zhang & Smith, 2017). 
Though Japan’s trinity model of ODA policy provided valuable lesson to 
Chinese policy makers, the Chinese-version aid trinity does not entirely resemble 
Japanese aid trinity. The way capital forces and the state dovetailed infrastructure 
projects with capital accumulation had been completely different from the Japanese 
capital logic and approach. Chinese style of aid trinity did not provide a unified plan to 
which extent aid, trade, and investment can be integrated and in what forms the 
infrastructure development could be carried out. Da Jingmao is merely a grand strategy 
to ostensibly showcase a top-down policy making running from Beijing down to the 
lowliest units, as depicted by Naughton (2010: 454), “Planning is ubiquitous in China, 
with seemingly every government organizations having long-range targets and 
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objectives; yet we will search in vain for a unified vision of the development of the 
economy that in any way predicts specific outcomes.”  
In a nutshell, in terms of concessional loan project, there is similarity between 
Japan’s early puro-fai mission and China’s approach. Chinese Ambassadors and the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s offices in the host country, in this case 
Indonesia, played important role, particularly in the loan project. The primary way 
contractors influence China’s aid is by lobbying MOFCOM and China EXIM Bank to 
access information on Indonesia’s demands for aid projects and link their commercial 
strategies with China’s aid programme. These contractors companies are the most active 
players in seeking for lucrative infrastructure projects and finding local partners and 
later the Chinese ambassador provided recommendation letter to the Chinese 
government. This approach somewhat resembled with what happened in Indonesia 
during the early years of Japanese ODA. However, in the case of China, contract is not 
always awarded based on the competitive bidding, insofar as the MOFCOM has the 
authority to directly appoint the company that it prefers.  
As is explained in the previous section, there have been serious attempts among 
Japanese government, agencies, and enterprises to have mutual support over each 
infrastructure-related policies and to link such policies with Indonesian development 
plan and economic rationalization. On the contrary, central to Chinese infrastructural 
regime is that the grand strategy, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 
going-out policy (zhou chu qu) only showcase superficial coherency, while in fact the 
implementation has been chaotic. State endorses a seemingly centralized policy vision 
that could by and large, accommodate different levels of interest and achieve social 
cohesion. Such infrastructure-dominating strategies (i.e Da Jingmao, Going Out, BRI), 
reflects the ways that that all forces – the private sector, centralized SOEs, provincial 
government, and capital forces have all been gradually mobilized to various sites for 
capital accumulation. This led to Chinese type of social cohesion in which no consensus 
on the nature other than the grand vision and extent of coordination among various 
actors. 
Chinese infrastructure modalities that tend to be framed in the discourse of 
‘development’, such as self-reliance, win-win solution, new development model and the 
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like, actually represent an entirely different history and a different niche for Chinese 
capital forces (see China Machinery Industry Yearbook Editorial Committee, 2018, p. 
6) . As such, the diversity of form and scope of infrastructure cooperation, in turn, 
results in competing and contradictory demands for nation-state policy. Unlike Japan’s 
pattern of capital formation, gradually starting from trade, investment, and ultimately 
connecting global production activities, Chinese pattern does not imply the existence of 
only one form of internationalization or capital accumulation in any stage. Different 
forms coexist and accordingly affect the grand vision of state in practices. This is 
perhaps why China never had country-specific assistance strategies like Japan have 
done for decades. Instead infrastructure projects abroad are generally built on 
project-by-project basis that not all linked to the production. In more simple terms, for 
example, in Indonesia, by only examining power plant sector, we already can draw a 
plethora of stories pertaining to Chinese-led projects. It can be a development partner 
that pursue an environmental-friendly power plant; some also can be monstrous that 
inking a coal-fired power plant deal only for the sake of seeking a rent and access to 
coal; other can just act as a passive investor who just want to learn know-how and gain 
market-share. Chinese infrastructure modalities compound fragmented interests, varying 
forms of capital structure, and different assemblage of state power. In words of Hameiri 
& Jones (2016:19), “Different parts of the Chinese state may pursue divergent or 
contradictory agendas, with outcomes reflecting disorganization and conflict, not grand 
strategy.”  
It is China’s going out policy that exerted a powerful pull on Southeast Asian 
economies and constituted an impetus for China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation. 
To beginning with, in a 1999 speech on the country’s economic future, Premier Zhu 
mentioned the term ‘going-out’ (zhou chuqu). He asserted a connection between the 
paucity of resources, especially oil and a need to go overseas, emphasizing, “Domestic 
development and production of oil can no longer keep pace with the needs of the 
country’s economic and social development, resulting in an increasing imbalance 
between oil supply and demand” (Zhu, 2001).  From the foregoing, Beijing adopted 
going out policy as part of the country’s Tenth Five Year Plan in 2001 to encourage 
enterprises with comparative advantages to make investment abroad, contract for 
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international engineering projects, and increase the export of labor. Central and 
provincial governments offered company incentives including tax breaks, cheap land at 
home, and low-interest funding from state-owned banks to advance international 
investment (Shuping & Yongsheng, 2014). To support the policy, the State Development 
Planning Commission was reformed along with bureaucracy streamlined. The 
Commission was renamed the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
in 2003 and responsible to compile a list of overseas opportunities for investment in 
those resources of which China was in short supply, such as oil, gas and timber and 
allocated investment budgets (Duncan, 2013). Regarding the MOFCOM, it has the 
Department of Foreign Aid that primarily responsible for delivering Chinese aid and the 
Economic Counselor’s office that is housed either within the embassy or in larger 
missions in a separate office takes charge on the aid program coordination. The 
MOFCOM also contains the Department of Outward Investment and Economic 
Cooperation, which regulates all Chinese companies engaged in international business 
with large investments (MOFCOM, 2007). On top of that, SASAC (State-owned Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission) were established in 2003. The 
Commission is a milestone in China’s going-out pathway, either outright owns or has a 
controlling share of 112 powerful SOEs (as of December 2013), some of which are the 
biggest resource companies in China. Its establishment represented a departure from the 
said chaotic situation, where multiple government ministries and other bureaucratic 
entities had leverage over SOEs daily operations. Equally important, together with 
NDRC, SASAC was tasked to set out fifty multinationals that would be part of the top 
500 firms globally by 2015 (Naughton & Tsai, 2015; Song Ligang, 2018).   
However, Chinese enterprises, either SOEs or private companies, represent 
“thousand faces” of China. They demonstrate an uneven integration into international 
economic activity and ultimately entail a frenzied and continuous trial and error search 
for capital accumulation. Very often, the boundaries between SOEs as party-state 
institutions and SOE as independent commercial entities became blurred. There have 
been also both corrupt and ineffective forces and progressive and productive one and 
these forces both opposed and complemented each other. Some become a fetter to 
international accumulation due to liberalization in pursuit of state project, while some 
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tapped into global circuit of capital accumulation with unrestricted mobility and 
commercially-driven – more similar to other major transnational companies. In a 
national level, Indonesia offers the representative assessment of such various settings of 
Chinese state-business relationship that reshaped the infrastructure regime in Indonesia.  
Firstly, a mere diplomatic project. During the early years of going out policy, 
there were numerous cases in which large-scale project were dealt with at a much more 
centralized level and delivered in the usual form of Chinese turn-key projects. Contracts 
classified as government-to-government agreements were generally seen as a faster way 
to develop projects, with the advantages of government guarantees and other facilitation 
in favor of projects. The relationship between the state (party) and companies, let alone 
SOEs is quite flexible. Government does not typically manage their day-to-day 
operations and the firms are largely still in charge of their basic business decisions. Yet, 
once party committees have a seat at the table when the company are making big calls 
on investment in cash-strapped projects and the like, means the boundaries between 
market and non-market arrangement have been blurred (see McGregor, 2019; Wu, 
2017).  
Delving into the case of Indonesia, the diplomatically driven projects in 
Indonesia have been typically linked with the “vulnerability” level of Indonesia within 
regional dynamics. After the crisis hit Indonesia, the government’s relationship with the 
IMF and Western countries reached its nadir as being frustrated by the “incorrect 
diagnosis” provided by the IMF for handling the crisis. Nevertheless, the country 
needed to restore delayed strategic projects which were badly needed for economic 
growth and attract foreign direct investment in the aftermath of crisis. Such regional 
dynamics yielded an impetus for China to shape its image as a ‘responsible power’. 
Moreover, Beijing’s moderate reactions over the 1998 May riots – an atrocious mass 
killings and rape towards ethnic Chinese women in Indonesia – won wide praise from 
Indonesian officials, many of whom saw it as how China respected Indonesia’s 
sovereignty and treated the anti-Chinese riots as a domestic issue (Novotny, 2010; 
Sukma, 2009). Further infrastructure cooperation was started under then President 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who openly stated that he has Chinese blood and his 
ancestor is Tan Qin Han who was part of Zheng He’s expedition to Indonesia. Soon 
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after he was sworn in as President, he paid state visit to China. China responded 
positively to Wahid’s overture and subsequently cooperation began to take shape in the 
form of a Joint Communique that was signed during Wahid’s visit to Beijing in 
December 1999 and later in May 2000, the establishment of Indonesia-China Joint 
Commission for Bilateral Cooperation that was signed by Foreign Ministries of both 
countries (Weatherbee, 2017, p. 141). The bilateral relations continued deepening 
during the Megawati period. In March 2002, Megawati made a five-day state visit, not 
only aimed at boosting trade relations, but also at raising finance for delayed 
infrastructure projects. The meeting was known as “waltz diplomatic” (diplomasi 
dansa) where Jiang Zemin surprised the guests by inviting Megawati to dance with him 
and praised Indonesia as “yuanjin bu ru qinling” (neighbor is better than a distant 
relative). The diplomasi dansa resulted in the signing of MoUs on some infrastructure 
projects, including the construction of U$ 70 million of a double track railroad between 
Cirebon and Kroya in West Java and the building of a power plant in Sumatra by the 
state-owned power company, PT PLN (MOFA China, 2002).  
Not least important, the meeting also revived the Surabaya-Madura Bridge 
project plan. Originally, by 1986, the plan to connect Sumatra, Java, and Bali caught the 
interests of a Japanese consortium and in 1990s numerous feasibility studies and 
planning for the Suramadu Bridge were set in motions (“60 Years Indonesia-China 
Relations,” 2010). The Asian Financial Crisis, which was also followed by a dramatic 
political change in Indonesia, halted the project. Under the Megawati’s period, it 
became part of the economic and technical cooperation between China and Indonesia. 
The 5,438 meter Suramadu Bridge, the largest cross-sea bridge in Indonesia, started 
construction in October 2005 and was completed on June 10, 2009 after three and a half 
year of hard work by the Indonesian Public Works Ministry and the bridge’s main 
contractor, China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). The entire project cost U$440 
million, most of the funding came in the form of a soft loan from China EXIM Bank 
and the rest funded by Indonesia (Chong, 2018, p. 82). Despite numerous problem 
arising during the construction, the bridge has become the “media darling” both in 
China and Indonesia. It revived the narrative of “learning from China” and 
demonstrated “a symbol of the two countries’ economic and technical cooperation” – 
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which later made way for private sectors and SOEs to leverage a move into 
infrastructure market in Indonesia.  
The second setting is excessive competition-based infrastructure. As 
mentioned above, the 2001 target further specified that by 2010, between thirty and fifty 
state-owned firms should be ‘national champions’, for which the SASAC has been 
tasked. The going-out period proved to be a transition in yet another respect. The 
advancement of companies occurred alongside an almost simultaneous influential 
policy actors and a wide range of interests. China has accordingly become more 
disjointed, with constant struggle over power, resources, and policy, from inception to 
implementation cut-throat competition among companies (McGregor, 2010, p. 
190)While there are some cases that large-scale projects were politically driven by 
central government, just as previously discussed, yet in another cases, Chinese 
corporate leaders with desires to gain profits and be promoted can subtly gloss over 
their vested interest through infrastructure projects. Contractors tend to use 
unreasonable bidding prices that are far lower than operating costs to compete in 
international markets that often outbid foreign contractors ( Zhou, 2018, p.163). 
In 2004, China State Council issued the “Decision on Investment System 
Reform” which formalized the market-oriented investment system instead of the 
government-driven approach (Shuping & Yongsheng, 2014). In Indonesia, this policy 
together with other government policies thereafter led to the expansion of Chinese 
companies to win the “concession” and triggered perverse incentives. For example, the 
going out policy is particularly rapid in the coal-fired sectors where Chinese firms 
engage in a large number of projects. It was in the 2005 Indonesia Infrastructure 
Summit2 that Chinese contractors got the opportunity to set foot in infrastructure 
market. Indonesia’s then President Yudhoyono, launched an ambitious regulatory 
reform agenda intended to create a predictable and transparent framework for 
infrastructure investment.  Indonesia that has just rebound the economy from the crisis, 
first-democratically elected government strived to create model deals that it would 
replicate in the future. Infrastructure is one of deal that would show the world that 
                                                       
2 The first Infrastructure Summit was held in 2005 and resulted in a list of 91 projects. The list increased to 101 
potential projects and 10 model projects as part of the second Infrastructure Summit in 2006.  
48 
“Indonesia is back from finsancial crisis and ready to do business” (Epstein, 2005; 
“Indonesia needs US$145bil for infrastructure projects,” 2005). One of mainstays of the 
summit is the Fast Track Project 1 (FTP 1). However, the absence of any government 
risk-sharing and questions about the project decision as well as the low quality of the 
tender document caused Japan and Westerner’ half-heartedly submitting proposal for the 
project. In turn, the risk taker like Chinese companies got the contract of FTP. How they 
got the contract was allegedly pertaining to the decision of high-level government. 
Based on confidential sources, reportedly Chinese proposals were too attractive to 
refuse since they offered to rebuild the electricity infrastructure at a lower price in a 
shorter time period. More importantly, the contractors did not ask for government 
guarantee. However, majority projects listed under FTP 1 were delayed, some failed to 
meet initial expectation. A case in point is none in China, Indonesia can appeal to, as 
deals were originally driven by individual incentives of the construction companies 
while the central government and policy bank might even do not know a good deal of 
knowledge pertaining to the project concession.  
 Such failed project also demonstrates how competition was exacerbated due to 
the tendency towards ‘duplicate construction’ (Hu, 2007, p. 111). It is one of a 
long-standing features as well as problems for enterprises in China. Unlike a 
well-segmented Japanese keiretsu system, it is characterized by simultaneous entry into 
the same sectors by many localities at the same technological level, which has caused 
massive waste and inefficient use of resources. There are signs of a new round of 
duplicate construction found within infrastructure-related projects overseas. Large-scale 
overcapacity in production has been transpiring since 2009, long before the launch of 
BRI. Due to lack of regional industrial coordination, many companies replicated other 
company’s projects – expanding beyond their mandated field in order to solve the 
excessive outputs. By and large, this has influenced their practices abroad, including in 
the FTP project.  
Thirdly, trials and errors-based infrastructure. Different from Japanese-led 
infrastructure projects that have supported economies of scale and been related with 
Japanese private sectors’ economic viability, the stumbling block of Chinese companies 
in tapping into Indonesian infrastructure market is the “incumbency effect” of the most 
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established investors, including Japan. This implicates that Chinese companies have to 
capture less explored markets, namely greenfield infrastructure. Majority potential 
infrastructure projects planned by Indonesian government are considered as greenfield 
infrastructure projects, that are highly rewarding, yet risky. As the world’s largest 
archipelago, Indonesia’s economic activities are spread unevenly across islands, and so 
are its infrastructure projects. Projects located in outer Java island pose a high level of 
uncertainty in realized demand from general users. This is often the case, because it is 
difficult to reasonably forecast future demand in the absence of reliable information at 
the planning stage. For example, railway projects in Kalimantan or Sulawesi proposed 
under the PPP scheme that are intended to be used for transporting commodities such as 
coal and ore, in fact failed to attract investors (see Briginshaw, 2014; Morishita, 2015). 
Considering fluctuations in commodity stocks and regulation uncertainties regarding 
commodity-related infrastructure, investors tend to stockpile enough commodities and 
seek market alternatives, rather than building value chain from scratch. In such setting, 
Chinese companies instead employ a wider range of methods for capital accumulation 
than ‘traditional’ investors, which include labor-intensive extraction and more ‘flexible’ 
infrastructure by building related-facilities and public infrastructure surrounding 
greenfield projects that are expected to encompass several links on a given value chain. 
Exemplary in this regard is the Indonesian Morowali Industrial Park, a joint venture 
between the Shanghai Decent Investment Group and PT Bintang Delapan Mineral with 
investment valued at U$ 980 million to boost Indonesian competitiveness in nickel 
downstream processing, including to diversify products such as lithium batteries that 
never be well-developed in the country before. Not only nickel plants, having backed by 
commercial financing from the CDB, the joint venture also has its own seaport and 
power plants, with an airport to be completed by the end of 2019.  
Another pattern includes taking ownership by acquiring a share of the rights or a 
company that already own those rights to a particular license, resource deposit, or 
project. As an example, Chinese companies that have gained experience and confidence 
in EPC projects in Indonesia, they begin to carry out a larger scale portfolio investment, 
in particular, by investing directly in major Indonesian coal mining companies that will 
supply coal to the power plant (Andrews-Speed, Qiu, & Len, 2016; Mori, 2019). In 
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2009, the China Huaneng Group jointly with the Guangdong provincial government 
offered several bids for a majority stake in PT Berau Coal, Indonesia’s fifth largest coal 
producer and finally purchased a 51 percent stake of the company. In 2013, the China 
Investment Corporation invested $1.9 billion in Bakrie Groups’ Bumi Resources, 
Indonesia’ largest coal company, widely seen as a bailout for the controversy ridden 
company.  Shenhua Overseas, a unit of China Shenhua Energy, one of China’s largest 
coal producers, acquired a minority interest in Bhakti Energy Persada to develop a coal 
mine in East Kalimantan. The Bukit Asam plant in South Sumatra is being jointly built 
and managed by a joint venture between China Huadian Corporation; PLN, a 
state-owned electricity utility, which holds a majority stake in the plant; and the Bukit 
Asam, an Indonesia mining SOEs while The China Exim Bank is providing the $1.2 
billion loan.  Another practice of engagement is that they engaged in large-scale 
projects without internalizing the asset, such as construction and engineering services 
for port and bridge by China Harbour Engineering Company in Indonesia. The reason is 
that the output of the project is directly compensated by Indonesian government by 
availability payment (AP), resembles with what many industrial observers bemoaned as 
“merchant mentality”, aimed only to grab short-term profits from projects, rather than 
plan for long-term. 
Last but not least, having political supports from the central government, 
Chinese SOEs has been able to emerge in counter-distinction to the historical or 
mainstream approach, create novel institutional approach, and ultimately challenge 
existing governance. The most representative example is the Jakarta-Bandung High 
Speed Railway (JBHSR) project. While Japan, the long-standing development partner 
of Indonesia, had undertaken a feasibility study of the JBHSR project for years, the 
project was eventually awarded to the PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China (KCIC), a joint 
venture of a consortium of four state-owned Indonesian enterprises and state-owned 
China Railway International Group in 2015 (Dharma & Suryadinata, 2019).  Insofar as 
China put forward the business-to-business approach that is diametrically different from 
Japan’s rigid financing system, and then delegated more authority to the SOEs and 
related ministries from both countries, it has paved way for the newly infrastructure 
financing scheme – “B to B” – and prompted interests from another companies to 
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follow the similar path – pioneering all projects related to the high-speed train project at 
the forefront. Albeit caveats and risks acknowledged, it basically has been of 
considerable challenge for the historical bloc, Japan.  
Heterogeneity among Chinese firms is a pattern that is typically overlooked in 
favor of generalization that paints Chinese firms as either monopolistic or powerful. 
Different forms of capital accumulation can coexist all at the same time which eventually 
affected the grand vision of state in practices. Thus far, it is fair to say that Chinese 
infrastructure regime has been hinging upon twin processes – state-led initiatives and 
uneven process of capital accumulation among Chinese companies (and sub-national 
entities such as provincial government). It behooves us to recall Segal’s (1994:352) 
argument that, “the only way to ensure China does not become more dangerous as it 
grows richer and stronger is to ensure that in practice, if not in law, there is more than 
one China to deal with.” Such twin processes require us to see the provinces and SOEs 
as somewhat independent actors separate from the central government that reshaped the 
China-led infrastructure regime in Indonesia.   
 
4. The Politics of Public Private Partnership and Challenges Ahead 
 
From the series of project inaugurations, policy announcements, and other 
actions in late 2015 and early 2016, it has been apparent that addressing infrastructure 
deficit is a pivotal agenda for Jokowi’s administration. Many Indonesian islands remain 
unconnected and as a result, most are self-sufficient economies that do not contribute or 
benefit from the national economic production and distribution process. In order to 
boost higher value output and sufficient infrastructure that ensures connectivity, Jokowi 
asserted his commitment to build new infrastructure on the outskirts of developed areas 
and in villages outside Java by allocating Rp 314 trillion (roughly US$ 22.5 billion) in 
the 2016 state budget. In total, the requirements are massive. US$450 billion worth of 
investment is needed to fund its infrastructure plans from 2014-2019, which comprises 
of six new refineries, 35,000 Megawatts of electricity capacity, and fifteen airports. In 
this respect, only thirty percent of the funding for these projects can be provided from 
public spending, while the remainder must be channeled from foreign capital (Suzuki, 
2015). PPP thus become one of viable mechanism that the government rely on so as to 
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boost private sector participation in Indonesian infrastructure development.  
In relations to PPP, any references to the BRI and PQI now have connotations of 
competition between Japan and China and of capital penetration into PPP projects. Just 
as frequently mentioned by Chinese officials, BRI will drive economic growth and 
connectivity in Indonesia particularly through port cooperation network and maritime 
connectivity construction – the once prosperous trade routes in history (Xiao, 2018). In 
the process, port cities alongside the construction of industrial zone will take on new 
functions of driving industrial transfer, industrial development, and finally value chain. 
Likewise, rationale behind Japan-led PQI is to support private sector investment in 
regional infrastructure, strengthen production base, and bolster economic growth with 
an emphasis on five elements of quality infrastructure, comprising: alignment with 
development strategy; stability, safety, and resiliency; economic and financial 
soundness; local high-quality development and; social and environmental sustainability 
(Izumi, 2017). Interestingly, there were also deliberate attempts among Indonesian 
agencies to capitalize on the grand initiative and maintain a narrative that the political 
effects of BRI-led projects will likely lead to the competition with Japan’s PQI and 
other Western counterparts. In 2015, for example, in responding China and Japan rivalry, 
Indonesian Coordinating Minister, Luhut Panjaitan commented that  “the 
Sino-Japanese race to invest in Indonesia benefitted the country and presented it with 
the option to ‘pick whoever it likes’ for the project (Rondonuwu, 2015).  
On the ground, progress indeed has been seen. The first stage of New Priok Port 
(Kalibaru Port) at Tanjung Priok led by Japan’s Mitsui &Co have been completed 
(Mitsui, 2016). The PQI has also made way for PPP projects financed by JBIC, among 
others the Java 1 Gas-to-Power Project in Indonesia, deemed as flagship project of the 
JBIC’s newly launched Global Facility to Promote Quality Infrastructure Investment for 
Environmental Preservation and Sustainable Growth. The project, that is also part of 
Indonesia 35,000 MW electricity vision, involves Sojitz Corporation, Marubeni 
Corporation, and Indonesia state-energy company, Pertamina. In Sulawesi, China has 
also involved in the first PPP project in the railway sector (Kameda, 2018). The China 
Communication Construction Engineering (CCCC) Indonesia set up a consortium of PT 
Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk (PTPP) jointly with Indonesian companies PT Iroda 
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Mitra and PT Bumi Karsa. The consortium won the tender with an investment bid of Rp 
1 trillion and an availability payment bid of Rp 246.74 billion for the 
Makassar-Parepare segment. The project will be carried out under the scheme of the 
design, build, finance, operation, and maintenance for the period of 20 years (Maulana, 
2019).  
A case in point is, the fact that these BRI and PQI-led projects have been 
agreed upon, does not necessarily imply that they will be implemented. Both Japan and 
China have beset with the very politically-difficult situation in the PPP implementation. 
The development of PPP in Indonesia has been structurally shaped and constrained by 
the political, economic, and social logics of the three different arenas in which the 
multitude of actors involved. In the international level, country leaders are pledging 
their commitment on the PPP as a “new style of development”, or in Jokowi’s rhetoric 
word, mengubah cara lama (change the old way) (Amindoni, 2016b). In central level, 
when the international agencies and line ministries interact, a seemingly-coordinated 
policy follows the logics of bureaucratic/technocratic rule and shows tendencies of 
strong ‘governmental role’ in facilitating the PPP. Bappenas has regularly published the 
PPP Blue Book while a number of relevant government regulations also provide more 
detailed information to private business entities to speed up project implementation 
(Ganesha, 2018). A crux of the matter is, at the sub-national level, PPP meets local 
contexts, moral politics, and economic nationalism. For example, local governments 
begin to experiment with their own versions of the PPP scheme often without a proper 
risk allocation mechanism and seek ‘investment partner’ that often clashed with central 
government. Due to different logics within the state, the interaction between these three 
arenas has led to contradictions, conflicts, and competition. It is somewhat safe to 
assume that infrastructure would be problem bearers rather than providing solutions.  
The first general PPP regulation that applied to all sectors is the Presidential 
Decree No.7 /1998 concerning Cooperation between Government and Private Business 
Entities in the Development and/or Management of Infrastructure that was later 
replaced by Presidential Regulation No. 67/2005 concerning Cooperation between 
Government and Business Entities in the Provision of Infrastructure. In 2010, in 
conjunction with the inception of MP3EI, Yudhoyono amended the regulation by 
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issuing Presidential Regulation No. 13/2010 and introduced dua jalur kebijakan (double 
track policy) in which infrastructure will be funded by state budget and private 
financing (Parikesit, 2017). Far before the inception of BRI and PQI, both China and 
Japan in fact have been aligning their interests with the framework. In May 2013, the 
government published an integrated grand strategy for infrastructure deployment: the 
Infrastructure Export Strategy. The strategy exhibited a numerical target of tripling 
infrastructure sales between 2010 and 2020 from 10 trillion yen to 30 trillion yen. Such 
reforms aimed at improving the yen loan system so as to promote Japanese companies’ 
participation in PPP Projects. The strategy was appropriately linked to Yudhoyono’s 
development policy. Various instruments were introduced, among others the SIAP 
(Strategic Investment Action Plan) to enact a regulatory and policy reform to encourage 
private investment and improve the key infrastructure to promote investment. Some 
large-scale IPP projects have been at the forefront. The aforementioned Batang 
coal-fired power plant and Geothermal Sarulla plan led by Itochu Corporation; the 
expansion of Paiton Energy by Mitsui; and the 220 MW Muara Laboh in West Sumatra 
and the 220 MW Rajabasa in Lampung by Sumitomo Corporation, have been part of the 
PPP cooperation (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2005; Shimamura & 
Wakasugi, 2009). On the Chinese side, aside from involving in some IPP projects, 
Chinese companies have been expressing their interests on the large-scale projects such 
as the Sunda Strait Bridge project that was listed in the 2013 PPP Book published by the 
Bappenas. The planned 29-kilometer bridge is the biggest infrastructure project listed in 
the Sumatra Economic Corridor in the government’s master plan MP3EI and later 
subsumed under the Sunda Strait Infrastructure and Strategic Zone signed by 
Yudhoyono. The 100 trillion rupiah bridge project was initiated by Artha Graha 
Network consortium by setting up a consortium, PT Bangungraha Sejahtera Mulia, 
jointly with Lampung-Banten local government. As the initiator, the consortium was 
responsible for feasibility study and had privilege to win the tender. Based on Beijing 
Review report, Yudhoyono and Hu Jindao signed an agreement to facilitate a joint 
investment in the Sunda Strait, that also involved the China Railway Construction 




Diagram 1: MP3EI Infrastructure Project  
 
 Source: KP3EI, Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs  
 
Although Japan and China used different approach to capture the shift in power 
configuration and resources allocation as explained in the previous section, both posed 
similar challenges pertaining to the PPP in Indonesia. The Sunda Bridge was left in 
limbo due to divided opinion among his ministers, particularly between Ministry of 
Finance and the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs as to whether the project 
should be funded by state funds, or categorized into PPP projects (“Groundbreaking of 
Sunda Strait Bridge Project Unlikely to Occur in 2014,” 2013; Wijaya, 2013) . 
Furthermore, private sectors continued to put leverage on the project, insisting that it is 
unsolicited projects in which they should have gained privilege access to tendering and 
construction. Likewise, Japan has actively promoted waste management system by 
using water-to-energy (WTE) technology in Mamminasata Metropolitan Area, 
Makassar which basically gained support from the central government. However, with 
the application of Law No. 23/2014 on Regional Governance and the Law No.38/2007 
on the allocation of governmental affairs to national, provincial, and district/city 
governments, responsibility of handling infrastructure projects (except for ones deemed 
as National Strategic Projects) has shifted from central to local (province/city/district 
government) (ERIA 2015). While a detailed engineering design (DED) for regional 
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landfill carried out by JICA was already implemented, the construction plan was 
unfortunately backed off due to site disapproval by the new Head of a district in 
Mamminasata (Damanhuri 2019). Instead of addressing structural problems, the 
development of regulatory framework further added complexities among different 
agencies and sectors. 
 When it comes to PPP, there are no “regulatory fix” appropriately working in 
Indonesia yet. Neither the “deinstitutionalization” of Chinese infrastructure regime nor 
“re-institutionalization” of Japanese infrastructure regime could really fit into the 
current regulatory arrangements insofar as domestic politics have significant leverage 
on them. Adverse regulatory decisions, breaches of contracts particularly by government, 
and undefined role of government in the PPP often caused delay or even failure of PPP 
projects. Conflicts between the policies of the central and local government as well as 
inclusion of new actors that added complexities often led to PPP implementation 
organizations not knowing how to proceed and eventually to bear unsatisfactory 
outcomes. The institutionalized relations and policy-based approach of Japan in 
Indonesia is too rigid to accommodate such political dynamics while the fragmented 
approach of China in Indonesia is too weak to maintain policy coherence, regional 
linkage, and sustainability of a deal. China’s piecemeal approach somehow constrains 
industry development, the productivity and efficiency of which requires consolidation 
and better scale economies through larger, multi-year contracts.  
In 2015, Jokowi issued a new Presidential Decree on PPP, i.e Presidential 
Decree No. 38 No.2015, addressed loopholes in previous regulations and introduced an 
availability payment model as a source of investment return in addition to traditional 
user payments in order to attract investors. In the following year, Jokowi’s long-list of 
strategic national projects in Presidential Regulation No.3/2016, most recently revised 
in Presidential Regulation No. 56/2018, has by and large drawn much interest from 
China and Japan. Jokowi also shelved a plan to build the Sunda Strait Bridge connecting 
the islands of Java and Sumatra and claimed that such massive funding should be 
allocated to the Eastern part of Indonesia instead of Java and Sumatra. Yet, the 
realization has not yet included many that would normally be thought of as basic 
infrastructure for economic growth. Rather, what have been included are oil refineries, 
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mineral smelters, aircraft manufacturing, gas drilling, and the like. Among others, Abadi 
WK Masela Field and Tangguh LNG Train 3 Project (KPPIP, 2018).  
Based on the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, it 
is still the energy sector that has been attracting the bulk of investments, or 93 percent 
of Prepaid Payment Instruments (PPI) transactions. The biggest contributor of the figure 
is the US$4.3 billion Japan-led Central Java Power Project and the US$1.8 billion 
China-led Java-7 Power Station – resulted in US$6.1 billion in investments. It is fair to 
say that the number is due to the energy sector now at least the sector that is less 
regulated than other sectors, such as port (World Bank Data, 2018). One of big caveat in 
furthering PPP projects in other sectors (port, toll, and railway) is the allocation of 
control rights. The function of government has always been problematic. By means of 
PPP, inherently, infrastructure services are carried out by private sector and government 
provides support, i.e in the form of tax exemption or subsidy or can be as guarantee for 
finance. What become problematic is, the rise of “governmentality” when the 
government sought to imprint a mark of their presence in the infrastructure development. 
Since taking office in late 2014, Jokowi has assigned a number of important projects to 
the state actors that were initially to be privately financed and implemented. These 
include the Trans-Sumatra highway, the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport rail link in 
Jakarta, the Makassar New Port in South Sulawesi, and the privatization of the 
management of small airport. Further concerns about the crowding out of private 
investment were fueled in July, when the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 
82/2015, which allowed the Indonesian Infrastructure Guarantee Fund (IIGF) to 
guarantee infrastructure financing through direct loans from international financial 
institutions to SOEs. Private contractors are thus left with even more limited choices of 
projects with less desirable returns.  
Insofar as the complexity of the risk allocation of PPP projects deterred private 
investors, numerous big companies as well as medium enterprises business arose within 
the region on the back of massive global financial inflows in areas like property and 
digital business, ironically under the name of infrastructure. China Communication 
Construction Group through its subsidiary, PT China Harbour Jakarta Real Estate 
Development, developed Daan Mogot City (Damoci) in the West Jakarta, an integrated 
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residential area. China Fortune Land Development through its Singapore office 
developed Lavon, under 200 hectare land that would be used as a mixed-use 
development, with industrial estate being built before the commercial and residential 
clusters and also Karawang New Industry City (KNIC) that cost U$ 100 million, 
claiming the projects as part of BRI. More interestingly Japanese trading companies hop 
on ride-hailing bandwagon in Indonesia. In July 2019, Mitsubishi Motors Corp invested 
in Indonesian ride-hailing giant Gojek, claiming the necessity of the accumulation of 
know-how of new mobility services that have been rapidly spreading in the region 
(Cordon, 2019). Similarly, it has been noticeable that at the present time METI and the 
JICA are refraining from making feasibility studies for direct investment in 
infrastructure projects in Indonesia. PQI project surveys carried out by Japan METI so 
far have been focused around LNG projects in Indonesia while more studies related to 
economic infrastructure such as ports are carried out in Vietnam (METI, 8 June 2018). 
Though great strides have been made in the last years, few PPPs have been put into 
operation. It is rather used as narrative to leverage economic interests and lead to 
unintended outcome.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Crucial merits of unpacking the Chinese and Japanese infrastructure regime 
through domestic political analysis are the flexibility to underpin interstate and 
intra-state relations from one discursive context to another, and the great emphasis on a 
process-based understanding of how loan project or investment have been carried out 
and of how policy is formulated and harmonized across different scales and interests. 
The analysis helps us to loosely examine how Japan and China’s infrastructure 
modalities transpired in the political domain of fragmentation, decentralization, and 
internationalization. Both reminded us of how policy can be fluid, dynamic, and even 
masked the complexity of interlocking patterns of socio-political and economic 
variables that are such ubiquitous and distinctive.  
Japan and China have different methodological ability to capture the shift in 
power relations and resources allocation that is inherent part of infrastructure regime. 
Chinese infrastructure regime has been traversing geographically uneven process of 
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capital expansion and invariably ‘deinstitutionalising’ power relations and policy 
formulation, while Japan’s regime has continuously facilitated a narrowing of the 
coalitional choices and institutional alternatives to political and economic forces. To 
some extent, the nature of infrastructure regime has made Japan becoming more 
cohesive while China has more fragmented approach in leveraging its infrastructure 
modalities. However, just as reflected in the politics of PPP, both have been coming to 
term with the structural issue and complex state-business relationship in Indonesia that 
led to distinctive forms of appearance of capital accumulation and political fixes 
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